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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Kumho Tire Co.
2
v. Carmichael, the United States Supreme Court set the law of expert
testimony on a quest for “reliability.” These decisions, as well as the
subsequent amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, make it
clear that trial judges are to perform a “gatekeeping” function,
filtering out offered testimony when the expertise on which it is
∗
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based, whether scientific or otherwise, is not reliable. Rule 702 now
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.3

Conditions (1)-(3) were added in 2000 in response to the teachings
of Daubert and Kumho Tire.
4
These developments have spawned a substantial literature.
Little attention has been given, however, to providing a careful
analysis of the contours and functions of the reliability concept itself
5
and its relationship to the purposes of admissibility rules. Daubert
and Kumho Tire tell us what kinds of factors to examine in order to
determine whether or not proffered expertise is reliable—factors
such as whether or not the theory has been tested empirically, and
whether or not it has been subjected to the rigors of peer review and
6
publication —and the 2000 amendment requires trial courts to
examine three different respects as to which the question of
reliability can be assessed. But these authorities say very little about
what is meant by reliability or exactly why an interest in reliability
should be manifested in the decision to exclude proffered evidence.
In Daubert, for example, the majority opinion states only that
evidentiary reliability is equivalent to “trustworthiness,” something
7
presumably to be demanded, and states this only in a footnote.
Without a formula for the synthesis and use of the identified
factors, which the Supreme Court quite understandably eschews, one
needs to reflect on how the law of admissibility structures trials in
order to synthesize all the pertinent considerations into an overall
reliability assessment that serves the law’s goals.
This Essay
3

FED. R. EVID. 702.
See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS,
STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 1-65 (2002).
5
Some sensible but brief comments are made in this regard by the current
editors of the McCormick treatise. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (John W.
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). An unusually insightful analysis is given in the context of a
recent proposal that English law adopt a reliability-based exclusionary rule for
criminal trials. See MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 116-39
(2001).
6
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52.
7
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
4
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undertakes such a conceptual examination and explores at least some
of its implications for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.
In Part II, I examine the most plausible understandings of the
reliability requirement, concluding that the best understanding is
rather different from the way it is commonly and even authoritatively
8
expressed. I argue that courts and commentators should disavow a
binary, all-or-nothing concept of reliability—that evidence is either
reliable or unreliable—in favor of a gradational concept—that the
reliability of evidence is a matter of degree. The apparently binary
mode of expression appearing in Rule 702 is misleadingly conclusory;
it provides no analytical framework for deciding how reliable is
reliable enough.
In Part III, I develop some of the implications of that conclusion,
suggesting a framework for the courts to use in assessing reliability for
the purpose of an admissibility ruling. Not surprisingly, this involves
weighing the degree of reliability of the proffered expertise against
the dangers that might arise from admitting the expertise. But once
this framework is identified, important conclusions emerge.
Primarily, I argue that concerns about jury misuse of expertise are
less important than concerns about controlling advocates so as to
provide the trier of fact, judge or jury, with expertise that is as reliable
as the circumstances of the litigation permit. I suggest one set of ways
to take this into account in a workable interpretation of the reliability
requirement in Rule 702.
To situate the present discussion, I should make an obvious but
important disclaimer: I do not assert that achieving a satisfactory or
optimal interpretation of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is
the most pressing issue affecting the use of expert testimony. Various
reform measures—including greater use of court-appointed
experts—may well be more important to the administration of justice
9
than the interpretive issue discussed here. Implementation of such
reforms might in turn affect the analysis of Rule 702, but no attempt
is made here to account for such complications.
II. THE “RELIABILITY” REQUIREMENT: A CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE
The Core Idea of Reliability. As suggested by the Supreme Court’s

8

In view of the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, I do not address here the
question of whether the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert developed the best
interpretation of that rule as it then read.
9
See, e.g., JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 193-211 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of reforms other than strict
application of admissibility standards).
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cursory reference to “trustworthiness,” the concept of reliability
entails a justifiable willingness to rest decision, in some manner, on
the thing considered reliable. Reliability is inherently relative to a
particular decision context, and thus relative to the goal or purpose
of decision.
In the context of the adjudicative legal norms
announced in Daubert, Kumho Tire, and revised Rule 702, the
decisions in question are verdicts, and the principal goal in mind is
the accuracy of those verdicts, within reasonable constraints of time
10
and cost.
The core idea, then, is a concern for the veritistic
properties of offered expertise and, perforce, the rules that control
the admissibility of such expertise. By “veritistic” I mean the truth
producing quality of the expertise or the regulative rules, truth
11
referring to the factual accuracy of verdicts. Evidence, or the rules
regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or
less conducive to accurate verdicts.
The requirement of reliability purports to be a veritistic
regulation by imposing some kind of supra-relevance veritistic
constraint on expertise that is introduced in court. These two ideas
are not necessarily conjoined. One could hold the view that the
veritistically optimal regulatory scheme is for courts not to concern
themselves directly with the issue of reliability at the admissibility
decision. Sometimes, the best way to reach a goal is for a particular
decision-maker not to focus directly on the goal itself.
For example, if the conditions of Coase’s Theorem hold, then a
court’s decision on the content of the substantive law will not affect
the efficiency of the rule at issue, so long as the court provides a clear
rule with reference to which parties are allowed to bargain; if the
court did not strike upon it, the parties will bargain to the efficient
12
solution.
Under these conditions, assuming that wealth
10

I consider later the possibility that accuracy of verdicts is not the goal relative
to which reliability is to be assessed. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
11
The indicated conduciveness may be understood in the sense of justification or
it may be understood in causal terms. If certain evidence justifies an inference as
accurate, then the use of that evidence is causally conducive to accurate inference,
unless the decision making is irrational. Since the concern for irrational decision
making (in the form of jury error) is a recurring one in the law of evidence, the
causal focus is more general and will be employed here. In this I follow the work of
epistemologist Alvin Goldman. See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL
WORLD (1999). Although the implications of such a veritistic social epistemology are
controversial, the general approach is compatible with traditional academic
conceptions of the goals of evidence law. Compare Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter,
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001), with Dale
A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV.
1551 (2001).
12
Assuming that parties attempt to maximize wealth, the principal condition that
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maximization is the principal goal that the court wants to achieve, the
court should focus not on choosing the allocation of entitlements
that is more or most efficient, but rather on choosing an allocation
that is clear and, ceteris paribus, one that is just or fair on nonefficiency grounds. A court’s attempt to go after efficiency directly
could well backfire if its ruling, trying to capture the elusive and
changing facts that conduce to efficiency, succeeds only in creating a
rule that is unclear, thus complicating the bargaining process.
Similarly, a justificatory premise of the adversary system is that
the clash of opposing, relevant evidence will yield accurate results, at
least frequently enough to render that system superior to the
13
alternatives. To the extent that the system is veritistically successful,
it is due to confluence of two factors. First, the system encourages
parties to present all relevant evidence that is reasonably available
and not too weak to be of practical use, each side in the dispute
having an incentive to present that which is significant and
14
favorable. Second, the system provides a trier of fact capable of
shouldering the responsibility of determining what inferences from
the evidence are warranted. Accepting these premises, courts need
not ordinarily concern themselves with the details of reliability or
trustworthiness in deciding whether or not to admit evidence; they
15
need only exclude that which is irrelevant.
Of course, many admissibility rules are based on perceived
exceptions to this general principle of adversarial veritism. In
particular, both the Supreme Court and Congress have decided that
the proffer of expertise should activate a decision process that looks
beyond mere relevance, and even beyond expert qualifications, to
examine the reliability of the expert testimony itself. But what exactly
must be satisfied is that the transaction costs of rearranging entitlements must not
exceed the gains from trade. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 10 (1960).
13
The locus classicus for this argument is Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961). The indicated premise
need not be that adversarial presentation of evidence is more accurate than
alternatives, only that it is not so much less accurate as to make it an inferior system
all things considered.
14
The importance of having all relevant evidence is that it constitutes a wellknown condition on the validity of inductive inference, often called the principle of
total evidence. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 11, describing his non-categorical
version as the “truth-in-evidence principle,” articulated as follows: “A larger body of
evidence is generally a better indicator of the truth-value of a hypothesis than a
smaller, contained body of evidence, as long as all the evidence propositions are true
and what they indicate is correctly interpreted.” Id. at 145.
15
Accordingly, the default rules are that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible and
that relevant evidence is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 402.
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does that mean? And how can this be implemented intelligently
within an adversarial framework?
Alternative Forms of the Reliability Requirement. Authoritative
expressions of the reliability requirement, both judicial and statutory,
generally express the requirement in a dichotomous or binary
fashion.
Proffered expertise is considered either reliable or
unreliable; reliability, it is implicitly assumed, does not come in
16
degrees. In Daubert the Court stated, “[U]nder the [Federal] Rules
[of Evidence] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
17
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”
Extending this basic gatekeeping function to all specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, the majority in Kumho Tire
opined, “The trial judge’s effort to assure that the specialized
testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate [the
expert’s] foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects
18
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”
Not
coincidentally, in each opinion the reliability requirement is
specifically coupled with the requirement of relevance, which—under
prevailing legal conceptions—is clearly dichotomous: evidence is
either relevant or irrelevant; it is not somewhat relevant, very
19
Similarly, amended Rule 702 states that, to be
relevant, etc.
admitted, proffered expert testimony must be “the product of reliable
principles and methods,” applied “reliably to the facts of the case.”
We are thus encouraged to believe that testimony either is or is not
the product of reliable methods reliably applied.
The alternative way of expressing the requirement would be to
say that there must be a showing of “sufficient reliability” for
admission. This locution implies a concept of reliability that is
gradational, a matter of degree. It is suggested by references in
Daubert to “the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources

16

See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 203, at 727.
509 U.S. at 589.
18
526 U.S. at 147-49 (quoted language appearing at 149).
19
This follows from the definition of relevance that is now widely accepted and
incorporated into the federal rules: “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Under the linguistic conventions of the federal
rules, expressions like “somewhat relevant” and “highly relevant” are simply
imprecise ways of expressing something about the probative value of the evidence, a
notion that is clearly gradational. Probative value can be low or high, very low or very
high, etc. See Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 733
(1986) (discussing formal measures of probative value).
17
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20

of information’,” a locution that presupposes reliability can be
“more” or “less” as well as “most.” It may also surface with the
reference in Rule 702(1) to “sufficient facts and data.” And it clearly
emerges in the drafters comment on the revised rule that numerous
factors are relevant “in determining whether expert testimony is
21
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.” I will argue
that this conception of reliability is clearly superior, relative to the
task we ask courts to perform. This in turn accounts for the tendency
of some commentators, in restating the requirement articulated in
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and revised Rule 702, to slip into the “sufficient
22
reliability” formulation.
The problem, of course, with expressing the requirement in the
latter way, a problem that may explain why that locution is often
avoided, is that, without some reasonably determinate algorithm
based on appropriate legal norms that would specify what degree of
reliability is “sufficient” for this purpose, the requirement of sufficient
23
reliability is vacuous. It tells us almost nothing.
Using the
dichotomous or binary form of expression might conceal this gap by
suggesting either that reliability is a straightforwardly binary factual
question, akin to the preliminary question of whether a document
24
offered in court is the original thereof, or that there is some
criterion of reliability that can be applied without directly invoking
25
such an algorithm.
If such suggestions are false, then what is
needed is a specification of not only the considerations that weigh
against admission of (assumedly) relevant expertise, but also some
indication of how to determine at what level of reliability these
counterweights ought to be controlling. The latter specification can
be purposive (laying out the purpose to be achieved and allowing the
trial courts to pursue the goal) or formulaic (providing a formula
that can be employed without reference to the purpose), or some of
20

509 U.S. at 591 n.9, 592 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note)
(emphasis added).
21
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (emphasis
added).
22
See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
“Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 617, 621 (2002).
23
Of course, the mere fact that a requirement of “sufficient reliability” is posited
by the Court and Congress tells the trial courts that some decision about reliability
should be made, as opposed to none. This message, however, gives no guidance
about how to make the reliability determination.
24
See FED. R. EVID. 1001, 1002.
25
By using the term “algorithm,” I do not intend to connote quantification or
computational precision, merely an intelligibly complete specification of an
analytical framework or procedure, something more informative than simply an
injunction to “solve the problem.”
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each. Despite the principal terminology used in Daubert, Kumho Tire,
and Rule 702, the new standard can be interpreted as attempting,
however confusingly and incompletely, such a hybrid instruction.
In fact, we often acknowledge that dichotomous antecedents in
legal rules really reflect such weighing algorithms. Take the cause of
action for negligence. Expressed in dichotomous fashion, we have: if
defendant was negligent (and the other elements of the cause of
action are present), compensation should be paid; if defendant was
not negligent, compensation should not be paid (under a negligence
theory). We all understand, do we not, that “negligence” is a
conclusion derived from some sort of normatively informed risk
26
algorithm, not an observable or discernible fact. In the rule, “If
defendant was negligent, compensation should be paid,” the term
“negligent” is simply a place-holder for such an algorithm; it carries
no independent force, except to alert us to the fact that the
referenced algorithm relates to the question of what degree of care is
socially demanded.
The dichotomous form of the reliability requirement could be
meant, or at least it could operate, in this way. If so, it is simply a less
transparently vacuous form of the “sufficient reliability”
27
requirement. We accept that reliability comes in degrees, and are
told implicitly that there are reasons to exclude evidence even
though it has more than de minimis reliability. The requirement of
reliability then says little more than this: identify those reasons and
decide whether they outweigh the law’s default principle of admitting
any evidence possessing probative value. In such a scheme, the
reliability requirement of Rule 702 is either redundant of the
28
balancing test of Rule 403, or it rather cryptically imposes
restrictions at least in some ways more demanding than Rule 403,
restrictions that need to be elucidated.
Reliability as Non-Binary.
The Court in Daubert identified
reliability, in the context of scientific evidence, with scientific
26

The algorithm might be a cost-benefit calculation a la Learned Hand, an
elaboration of a categorical imperative a la Kant, or yet some other idea.
27
Even before Daubert was decided, Professor Moenssens asserted the importance
of reliability assessments, using dichotomous reliability terminology, but then felt
impelled to recognize that such a concept of reliability is a conclusion, a “value
judgment,” derived from the weighing of legal norms. See Andre Moenssens,
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence—An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 545, 564-67 (1984).
28
FED. R. EVID. 403: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
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29

validity.
The nature of the problem is thus illuminated by a
digression relating to scientific validity. A quick review of some of the
Daubert factors demonstrates why scientific validity is not easily
understood in binary terms, except once again as the expression of a
conclusion relative to some particular task.
Consider the first “factor” adduced for the assessment of the
reliability of a purportedly scientific theory or technique: “whether it
30
can be (and has been) tested.”
How much testing does it take
before a principle or technique can be said to have been “tested” for
this purpose? Good scientists know that replication of results is an
important part of the scientific method. Can, then, a principle or
technique be considered “tested” if only one test has ever been
conducted? Two? Three? Does it not depend on the quality of the
tests as well as their quantity? If so, this points to a concept of testing
that is a matter of degree, more testing being better than less, ceteris
paribus, and testing that is more closely related to the proposition of
31
interest being better than testing that is more distant.
Similarly, if subjection to the demands of peer review and
32
publication is an important factor, as the Court opines, it should
matter how rigorous the peer review of a particular publication is,
and that is surely a matter of degree as to which not all publications
33
are alike.
Relatedly, although the degree of acceptance of a
principle or technique within a particular community of experts is
certainly pertinent to an assessment of the degree of its reliability,
little should turn on the artificial question of whether that degree of
acceptance has passed from just below to just over 50% of the
relevant community. Better is for courts to appreciate the degree of
the support in the relevant community in deciding what to do with
the proffer under some standard that does not make general

29

509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability
will be based upon scientific validity”); id. at 592-93 (stating that the trial judge’s
reliability determination “entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”).
30
Id. at 593.
31
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[2], at 35 (“Only through replications,
using various designs and methods, do scientists gain confidence that a hypothesis
has been sufficiently corroborated. No magic number or moment determines this
point, however; like many areas of the law, science presents a broad spectrum of
grays that over time sharpens into black and white.”).
32
509 U.S. at 593-94.
33
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.3 (noting variance in the status of
journals and the quality of peer reviews).
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34

acceptance a touchstone.
35
Then there is the matter of “error rates.” How precisely must
we know the error rate of a particular technique? And what does one
make of a technique with a known, very high error rate? The rate
may be known with some precision, but that does not mean the
technique gets a “yes” answer to this component of the reliability
inquiry. Rather, the question must be transformed into one that
inquires how large the known error rate can be before the technique
must be rejected by the courts as unhelpful. That is a “How high is
36
too high?” question, not a “Yes or no?” question. The same is true
for the maintenance of standards controlling a techniques operation,
37
considered as an indicium of reliability.
These quick observations could be multiplied easily. They point
to a fact that scientists, at least sophisticated ones, surely understand:
scientific validity is not an all-or-nothing characteristic; rather, it is a
38
matter of degree. This proposition poses the question of how one
gets from a consideration of the degree of scientific validity to the
undeniably binary decision of whether or not to admit proffered
testimony. Of course, the same question is posed by the notion of
validity as a synonym or proxy for the reliability of non-scientific
expertise. Thus, the fundamental problem is how to map from a
34

Indeed, the Daubert opinion does not state starkly that majority approval is
significant in and of itself, even as a “factor”; rather, quoting an earlier Third Circuit
opinion, it states,
A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit,
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express
determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.” Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in
ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,”
may properly be viewed with skepticism.
509 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted).
35
“[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should
consider the known or potential rate of error” as a pertinent factor. Id.
36
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4.2[1], at 35 (noting that “any science
that is even slightly better than flipping a coin” is likely to meet the test of “assisting
the trier of fact,” so that Rule 702 “must embody, at least in part, a Rule 403
analysis”).
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
38
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.4, at 25 (“[A]s every scientist knows, validity
is not a categorical conclusion.”); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING
SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1999) (“‘Validity’ in
science is not a binary attribute, like pregnancy.”); Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of
Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L.
REV. 1047, 1062 (1999) (“The Supreme Court . . . failed to acknowledge that . . .
scientific reliability is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the
application of the evidence and the acceptable risk of error.”).
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gradational epistemic conception of reliability to a dichotomous legal choice on
admissibility. The following sections consider the options available for
solving this problem.
Dichotomy by Deference. Perhaps the Supreme Court intended a
dichotomous reliability requirement that can be determined by
reference to more or less factual propositions about the standards of
non-legal institutions or their proper application, without the aid of a
legal-policy informed algorithm of the type described above. Indeed,
there is much language in Daubert that suggests this. As already
noted, the Court’s opinion identifies reliability, in the context of
scientific evidence, with scientific validity. That would appear to be a
more or less factual (at least, non-legal) inquiry into the application
of standards of scientific inquiry specified by the scientific
39
community.
The well-known factors identified in the Court’s
opinion seem to have a similarly factual and deferential character:
Has the theory or principle been tested? Does it have a known error
rate? Has it been published and subjected to peer review? Has the
principle been applied according to standards developed by the
scientific community? Does it enjoy general acceptance among the
40
relevant scientific community?
To be sure, the Court made a point of refusing to provide a
means of determining how many “yes” answers to the five questions
posed above are required before reliability is established. And if, as I
have argued above, it makes little sense to talk in terms of looking for
“yes” or “no” answers to the questions posed by the Court’s
enumerated factors, the problem of synthesis is all the more difficult.
This, however, is actually consistent with the idea that the Court is
deferring to the norms of the scientific community: The Court has no
particular skill for answering the synthetic question ex ante; rather, it
must be answered by investigation, more or less the way a court in
state X decides a question of law governed by the law of state Y. In
this case, however, state Y is the State of Science, a state with no
recognized supreme court.
Moreover, because the Court
acknowledged that yet other questions might need to be answered,
that other factors might need to be considered, no fixed formula can
be specified. The Court understandably concedes the imperfections
in its knowledge of, and thus its ability to articulate ex ante, the validity

39

See Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 231 (2000) (“The move from Frye to Daubert increases
judges’ gatekeeping duty by requiring them to evaluate claims of scientific expertise
much as scientists would.”).
40
See 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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laws of the State of Science.
Those familiar with admissibility standards in the mold of Frye v.
41
United States may quibble with my use of the term “deferential” to
describe this interpretation of Daubert’s reliability inquiry. Daubert,
after all, rejected Frye as a matter of statutory interpretation, and Frye
42
represented deference to the scientific community. From a broader
perspective, however, Daubert might be understood as endorsing
simply a different kind of deference. Fyre mandated deference to the
collective opinion of scientists in the relevant field concerning the
validity of the proffered expertise. Daubert might be understood as
mandating instead deference to the norms of science, norms that
must be applied directly by trial and appellate judges, without
accepting the collective opinion of scientists as a conclusive proxy for
43
validity. This interpretation of Daubert cannot be rejected simply
because Daubert rejected Frye-type deference.
Still, it is hard to believe that this non-Frye form of deference is
what the Court really intended, or would intend if it had clearly
thought the matter through. The obvious problem, one frequently
noted, is that judges must become junior scientists in order to try to
apply the normative standards of the scientific community. This is a
task that some judges are probably incapable of performing
adequately, and one certainly that some judges believe they are
44
incapable of performing adequately.
It is complicated by
disagreement among scientists and philosophers of science regarding
the norms of scientific disciplines, disagreement of which there is
45
barely a hint in the Court’s opinions. This difficulty, however real in
some cases, may be somewhat exaggerated. In many contexts of
ordinary science, it surely is possible for judges, with some assistance,
to make reasonable calls that would parallel those of good scientists
46
who have not lost their objectivity.
41

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (applying a “general acceptance in the particular
field” test for novel scientific evidence).
42
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-89.
43
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.0, at 13 (comparing Frye and Daubert).
44
See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part)
(casting doubt on the ability of judges to perform the contemplated task); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J., on
remand, bemoaning the Supreme Court’s “Brave New World” in which judges must
decide whether a qualified scientist’s testimony is “good science” “derived by the
scientific method.”).
45
See generally David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?:
The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
685 (2000).
46
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
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The more fundamental question is this: Why should the final
determination, reliable or not in court, be determined by the norms
of the scientific community instead of those of the legal community
(other than the legal norm of deference itself)? If the scientific
community recognizes scientific validity as a gradational, non-binary
concept, as I think it does and must, then that community must
employ one or more normatively informed, more or less determinate
algorithms of its own for making any categorical determinations of
validity that it is called upon to make. These norms will have
developed to serve the interests of science or, more precisely, the
47
scientific community. And if the scientific community sometimes
thinks of scientific validity as an all-or-nothing concept, it is only
because that community has developed dichotomous rules of thumb
that, while over- and under-inclusive in some cases, roughly serve to
further those interests. Why then should the scientific community’s
balancing of those interests, whether consciously and directly or
indirectly by the application of rules of thumb, be taken as
controlling the conduct of litigation?
Three initially plausible reasons can be identified, though each
48
must be rejected in the end. First, it might be thought that the
purposes and goals of the scientific community are the same as those
of the law of adjudication, or at least so nearly the same that the
difference is not worth much concern. This supposed reason,
however, is not likely to hold true in the scientific context. To be
sure, both disciplines place a high priority on the ascertainment of
truth by the application of relatively formal procedures. But the
parameters that give shape to this quest differ noticeably: those of
good adjudication include, for example, an emphasis on promptness
and finality of decision that is incompatible with the goals of science,
49
as Justice Blackmun himself observed pointedly in Daubert.
LAW 64 (1999) (“[M]ost judges are intelligent and well educated and there is no
reason why they cannot with diligence master the basics of the scientific method and
statistical theory.”).
47
I do not mean to imply that these interests are narrow or selfish, just that they
are accepted within the scientific community. On the other hand, that does not
preclude the possibility of significant rent-seeking, including the shaping of norms so
as to augment public funding of scientific research.
48
A fourth possible reason actually has considerable merit. It is based on the
assertion by the proponent or its expert that the expertise is scientifically sound. This
certainly provides a reason to defer to scientific standards, at least as part of the
analysis. This reason, however, which depends on the precise claim being made by
the proponent, is readily accommodated within a framework that employs a
gradational reliability concept and a balancing test. See infra notes 185-93 and
accompanying text.
49
509 U.S. at 596-97.
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For example, the law’s concession to unavoidable doubt often
entails an aversion to false negatives (e.g., refusing to impose civil
liability on defendant for want of proof of causation when its product
did in fact cause plaintiff’s injury) that is almost as strong as its
aversion to false positives (e.g., imposing liability when defendant’s
50
product did not cause the plaintiff’s injury). This trade-off is not
reflected in the typical scientific standards of hypothesis testing,
51
themselves important norms of scientific validity.
Thus, the
conservative convention in social science that (generally) insists on
results that possess a statistical “p value” of less than 0.05 before a
difference among one or more comparison groups will be deemed
“statistically significant” is an inferential norm that gives priority to
the avoidance of false positive conclusions. The idea is that, with a
risk of false positive conclusions greater than 5% were the “null
hypothesis” of “no difference” true, that hypothesis cannot safely be
rejected. In that case, scientists are prepared to leave the matter in
limbo pending further study. The law of trials, however, cannot so
indefinitely postpone making a judgment, but must rely on whatever
52
evidence is reasonably available at the time of decision. Even in
criminal cases, this difference is significant, most conspicuously in
assessing evidence offered by the accused.
These observations reflect the fact that the argument from
identity of goals is profoundly incomplete without an explanation of
how legal admissibility norms, which concern the helpfulness of
information in reaching an accurate and final verdict on particular
events in accordance with the applicable burden of persuasion in an
adversarial system, map to scientific validity norms, which relate to the
permissibility of scientists deriving revisable conclusions about the
50

Almost, but not quite. See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17
HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 647, 659-72 (1994) (arguing that a false positive verdict is
more serious than a false negative one whenever the former entails an imputation of
serious wrongdoing by the defendant but the latter does not entail an imputation of
serious wrongdoing by the plaintiff).
51
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1164-67 (1994) (discussing this difference in the context of the
epidemiological evidence in Daubert); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300-02 (2001) (emphasizing
differences between law’s assessment of causation and scientific assessments of
causation); Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 1099-1102 (same).
52
The point is carefully examined in Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil
Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 943 (2003); see also David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of
Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1983) (explaining the complex
relationship between statistical significance and the burden of persuasion).
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general patterns of causation drawn from data or information. While it
is fairly safe to assume that such scientifically well-grounded
conclusions are going to be helpful in lawsuits to which they are
relevant, the converse cannot be safely assumed. Scientific validity, as
understood by scientists, should not be considered necessary in all
53
cases for adjudicative helpfulness.
The second possible reason to defer in this way is more subtle.
Even if the criterion of sufficient reliability for conclusions in science
is seriously different from the theoretically appropriate criterion of
sufficient reliability for admissibility in adjudication, the law might
choose to defer to the scientific criterion simply to avoid controversy,
to use a more determinate scientific criterion in place of a more
debatable legal criterion. This argumentative candidate has at least a
chance of success in the context of scientific evidence, because
portions of the scientific community have standards of reliability that
are reasonably determinate in some contexts.
Ultimately, however, it is unconvincing. The voluminous postDaubert litigation has shown that the new standards have hardly
avoided controversy. Relatedly, because of the significant difference
between the goals and purposes of the law and those of science, an
inevitable tension will arise in attempting to maintain this kind of
deference. Courts will be pulled to develop more pertinent legal
standards, even in the face of potential controversy about the content
thereof. In any event, the failure of such deference, to the extent
based on this consideration, would be well deserved. Avoiding
controversy does not really concern the kind of costs that properly
should be balanced against our interest in accuracy. Rather, it
involves trading off (rather unsuccessfully at that) the goals of the law
for the convenience and comfort of judges and the rest of the
54
political establishment.
Perhaps, however, the avoidance of controversy is not really the
point. We can recast this into a third argument for deference if we
are willing to relax more candidly the assumption that accuracy of
verdicts is the primary consideration with respect to which reliability
53

See generally Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and
the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 971-78 (1999) (noting
that the majority opinion in Daubert failed to realize the implications of its
acknowledgment of the differences between law and science).
54
Some kinds of costs obviously must constitute counterweights to the admission
of relevant evidence and indeed to the implementation of all rules that are veritistic
in design. There are limits to the amount of social resources that should be allocated
to improving accuracy of decision. The experience of controversy may be unsettling,
but it is a cost we expect judges to endure in the course of adjudicating disputes, at
least if it cannot be reduced without sacrificing accuracy.

206

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:191

is required. Suppose instead that public confidence in verdicts is the
55
primary consideration. If so, then a desire to create or maintain an
undeserved public confidence that verdicts reflect the certain truth
might cause the Court and Congress to insist that seemingly scientific
experts testify only when their underlying expertise meets some
demanding standards employed in scientific investigation. In a civil
case involving a plaintiff’s offer of ostensible expertise that does not
meet the standards of science, the tortured thinking might run like
this: If the jury decides in favor of the plaintiff, and the public
becomes aware (as indeed the media will make sure they do) that
some of the evidence in the case was not up to scientific standards,
then the public might believe that the jury was duped into relying
excessively upon that particular piece of expertise (as indeed the
defense will publicly assert). Thus, the public will come to doubt the
veracity of the jury’s verdict, even if that verdict is entirely proper.
This, too, is ultimately unsatisfactory as a justification of
deference, even if the embedded behavioral assumptions are true.
Within a broad range of normal applications, public confidence in
the law, though certainly important, is a value that should remain
subordinate (indeed, lexicographically inferior) to accuracy of
inference and decision in accordance with the established burden of
persuasion. Moreover, in the long run, to sacrifice these goals for the
sake of public confidence is likely to endanger the very public
confidence that is desired. Playing the public confidence game can
56
backfire once it becomes public that this is the game being played.
Is the situation different for non-scientific expertise, what Rule
702 refers to as “technical or other specialized knowledge”? There
are serious, practical disciplines, such as clinical medicine, for which
it can be said that the parameters of decision, such as the priority
given to accuracy, promptness, and even finality, are more akin to
those of adjudication than are the pure sciences. We recognize this
in myriad ways, such as the important deference represented by the
exception to the hearsay rule contained within Rule 703, allowing
expert opinions to be based on facts or data that are not necessarily
admissible if they are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
55

Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (arguing that many rules of
admissibility and sufficiency are attributable to an explicit or implicit policy of
generating verdicts acceptable to the public, whether accurate or not).
56
In the same way, the value of impartiality in the decision-maker should carry a
higher priority than the value, important as it is, of projecting an appearance of
impartiality to the public, and one of the best (though not infallible) means for
maintaining the appearance of impartiality is to maintain real impartiality.
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the particular field in forming opinions of inferences upon the
57
subject.”
Although this provision facially does not distinguish
among different types of expertise, the conspicuous illustration
usually given to justify it is the physician making “life-and-death
decisions” based on hospital records, X-rays, and statements by the
58
patient’s relatives and other medical personnel.
On the other hand, there are countless forms of “specialized
knowledge,” ranging from astrology to plumbing, for which this is not
true. And some non-scientific disciplines, even some that have been
regularly employed in litigated cases for decades, have little or no
59
extra-disciplinary checks on reliability. As recent debates have made
clear, this may be especially true for disciplines, such as handwriting
identification, that have been developed for, and find little
60
application other than, forensic uses. To defer to the normative
standards of reliability in such disciplines would be to abdicate the
61
basic gatekeeping function.
As a general strategy, therefore,
deference to the reliability norms of non-legal institutions is no more
plausible in the context of non-scientific expertise than it is with
regard to scientific expertise.
The law of admissibility might attempt to tailor this discipline by
discipline, deferring only to those non-legal institutional norm
systems that generate reliability standards fairly close to those that
law’s normative, policy-based prescriptions would yield directly. But
why go to this trouble? It would, after all, require the same nondeferential assessment that, under a more generally non-deferential
approach, would have to be done directly, except that it would be
57

FED. R. EVID. 703.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (distinguishing as impermissible
the case of an accidentologist relying on reports of bystanders who observed an
accident).
59
Even in a context like conventional medicine, there may be good reasons to
doubt the reliability of decision making; a nominal concern for accuracy,
promptness, and finality that is similar to the law’s may not in fact translate into a
degree of reliability that the law should consider appropriate for the resolution of
disputes. See, e.g., John M. Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and
Medicine Be Reconciled?, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 369, 369-70 (2001) (“[T]here is
sufficient evidence to suggest that most clinicians’ practices do not reflect the
principles of evidence-based medicine but rather are based on tradition, their most
recent experience, what they learned years ago in medical school, or what they have
heard from their friends.”).
60
See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1091 (1998).
61
This, of course, is not to say that the degree to which a proposed expert follows
the normative standards of his or her own discipline is irrelevant to a reliability
assessment. Significant divergence is a red flag suggesting bias and calls for
explanation.
58
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attempted over whole classes of expertise. Moreover, to use a
deferential standard for some categories of expertise and a nondeferential standard for others would require a kind of disciplinary
line-drawing that was rejected in Kumho Tire.
Affirming the
applicability of the reliability standard to all kinds of expertise,
whether or not commonly regarded as “scientific,” the majority
rightly opined that, while the factors that might be useful is assessing
reliability should vary with context, no distinction between science
and non-science can be doctrinally justified or practicably
62
maintained.
The same constraints prevent us from using a
deferential, dichotomous reliability concept for some non-scientific
expertise but not others.
Indeed, Kumho Tire represents the end of the deferential regime
that Daubert might seem to have put in place, notwithstanding the
63
emphasis placed on professional standards.
When Daubert tied
reliability (for scientific evidence) to the idea of scientific validity and
suggested factors that might be taken into account in assessing
validity, the opinion left unclear whether the judiciary should use
those factors because the judgment of (hypothetical) good scientists
is determinative, or rather because those factors are generally useful
tools for reaching a legal-policy based assessment of validity that may
or may not accord with what scientific norms would require. Kumho
Tire appears to have resolved this question: “[A] trial court should
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are
64
reasonable measures of the reliability of the expert testimony.”
What is “reasonable,” in turn, is a matter of legal policy, not scientific
65
Kumho Tire thus frees Daubert to allow that there is an
policy.
important analytical difference, even in the context of scientific
evidence, between legal norms of reliability and norms of validity or
reliability that inform the inference processes in any non-legal
66
discipline that is invoked in testimony.
62

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
See id. at 152 (indicating that one purpose of the reliability requirement is to
assure that an expert employs “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field”); see supra note 61.
64
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
65
Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1, at 43 (“Whether the basis for a
proffered expert opinion is valid depends on what that opinion is, and what
consequences follow from it. This is a matter of policy, not science.”).
66
I am not suggesting any extreme post-modernism, any wholly social
construction of truth. I present no challenge to the philosophically conventional
thrust of the reliability factors identified by the Supreme Court and lower courts or
the essentially veritistic aims associated with them. Of course, what is taken as true
after a trial, the verdict upon which legal action is taken, is certainly a proposition
63
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Dichotomy without Deference. Having rejected deference, we should
consider whether it is possible to maintain such a dichotomous
reliability concept without invoking sub silentio a policy-based
balancing formula that renders the supposedly binary determination
simply a report of the conclusion obtained by such balancing. Is
there a way to map facts, including non-legal institutional facts, to
such a dichotomous legal determination of reliability? The answer is
certainly, “Yes,” but again it is very hard to find a workable
formulation that is compatible with established doctrine and
institutional capacities.
What exactly are we looking for here? One possibility is a binary
factual determination the satisfaction of which, by the consequent
admission of evidence, can be expected to improve verdict accuracy.
A direct approach would have courts make assessments of the overall
propensity of certain evidence to yield accurate verdicts. That is,
proffered expertise would be considered reliable if its admission has
the propensity to produce more accurate verdicts, in all cases or at
67
least in cases of this type. Alternatively, the suggestion might be that
judges should assess directly whether admission will achieve the
proper balance between the risk of false positive verdicts and the risk
68
of false negative verdicts.
These suggestions are problematic,
however, if they assume that the judge, in making admissibility
rulings, uses knowledge of the truth about the disputed material
facts. The reliability inquiry should not lead to a practice of using

that might diverge from what, on purely epistemic grounds, one ought to believe to
be true, if for no other reason than the fact that considerable relevant evidence is
privileged and thus removed from consideration. That does not alter the fact that
the primary objective of the trial is veritistic, looking to the accurate application of
substantive law to probable adjudicative facts. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
85 (1971) (“The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of evidence,
and the like, are best calculated to advance this purpose consistent with the other
ends of the law.”).
67
Analogously, speaking about the evaluation of social practices in terms of the
accuracy of its user’s beliefs (the beliefs’ “veritistic value” or “V-value”), Professor
Goldman writes:
Suppose the range of pertinent applications of the practice has been
settled.
Theoretically, then, we can take the average (mean)
performance of the practice across those applications as a measure of
its V-value. If on average the practice increases the V-values of the
user’s belief states, the practice has positive V-value. If on average it
decreases the V-values of the user’s belief states, the practice has
negative V-value. And if on average it leaves the V-values of the beliefs
unchanged, the V-value of the practice is neutral.
GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 92.
68
See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without
Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 266-67 (2003).
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admissibility to engineer what the trial judge believes to be the right
verdict. On the other hand, such suggestions presumably mean
something more demanding than simply the exclusion of expertise
69
that does not assist the trier of fact.
If, then, the indicated
suggestions are to occupy the precarious middle ground between
these two conceptions of the judicial role, can they work? I think not,
for they suffer from even more daunting practical difficulties than the
deferential approach.
The difficulty already noted—that judges under Daubert must
become surrogate experts in the relevant field—is thereby
compounded by a different problem. Now the greater problem is
that judges in each context would have to become a special kind of
expert, predicting the impact of alleged expertise (of whatever
species) on the adjudication of disputes. In the vast majority of
contexts, moreover, this would have to be done without the benefit of
extant social science regarding the behavior of triers of fact. For
example, more so than having to become an expert in DNA
technology in order to evaluate some new genetic evidence
technique, the judge would have to become trained in the analysis of
the impact of the new technique on juries, presumably as indicated
by the social science of similar or related techniques, if any exist.
Without such knowledge, the judiciary would have to proceed based
on the collective prejudices of the legal profession as they are passed
from generation to generation. Suffice it to say, the perspicacity of
70
the latter has been shown to be seriously wanting.
And there are further problems.
In this context, the
determination of reliability likely will be dependent on the meaning
71
given to “cases of this type.” Depending on the range of potential
applications (admissions) of the contemplated expertise, it might be
reliable or unreliable. Nor is this problem avoided by the emphasis
in Kumho Tire on addressing reliability not in the abstract but rather
72
in regard to the “task at hand.” Commentators have noted that this
69

The idea of assisting the trier of fact to perform its factfinding task is addressed
in Part III, infra.
70
Outside the area of experts, empirical research has shown that professional
expectations about jury behavior are often wide of the mark. See, e.g., Shari Diamond
& Neal Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001)
(reporting results of observations of jury deliberations in regard to discussion of
insurance); Peter Meine et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992) (reporting results of mock jury studies in
regard to hearsay evidence). On professional expectations of jurors in regard to
expert testimony, see discussion infra, notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
71
See supra text accompanying note 67.
72
526 U.S. at 141 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).
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appears to require not a global focus but a local one; reliability must
be established relative to the particular inference the expert is being
73
called upon to make. There is an undeniable element of truth here,
but pressed to its logical conclusion, this would make determinations
of reliability all but impossible, for the particular task at hand in a
lawsuit is never replicated in research. Trials, and the issues that they
present, are unique events. In order to make any assessment of
reliability of a claimed expertise, one must address the veritistic
propensity of such testimony, the evidence for which is inherently
statistical, based on experienced frequencies over some class of cases.
Of course, the “task at hand” should not be understood too broadly—
and certainly some courts have been guilty of such untailored
analysis—but even with appropriate sharpening of focus, at the
margin there may remain enough play in the joints that veritistic
propensities can be manipulated by task selection.
These problems might be avoided if the courts were to employ a
reliability test that is less epistemically demanding for judges. Many
rules of admissibility that do not concern experts provide models of
what this might look like. Consider the rule excluding hearsay. That
rule does not provide that, when confronted with evidence of a
statement not made on the stand in the current trial, the trial judge
should consider designated factors, such as the absence of crossexamination of the declarant, and weigh these against the probative
value of such evidence in order to decide admissibility. Nor does it
say, more elliptically, that the trial judge should simply weigh all
competing factors, without specification of what those might be.
Instead, it requires categorically the exclusion of such a statement
when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, if it does not
come within one of the (for the most part equally) factually binary
74
exceptions. In other words, these dichotomous tests encapsulate, or
so it is hoped, the goals of the adjudicative law, the most important of
which in this context is verdict accuracy, but without requiring, at
least in the ordinary case, any advertence to those goals or the
balance of competing considerations that relate thereto. Indeed, this
75
in many ways is the essence of rule-governed decision-making.
In this vein, one might select one or more dichotomous proxies
for reliability, each of which tests for one particular and important

73

See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic
Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).
74
See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII.
75
See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
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way in which reliability can be undermined. If the expertise is not
undermined in one of these specific ways, the expertise satisfies the
reliability requirement. Such a proxy test, if well or fortuitously
designed or evolved, might not be too over-inclusive or underinclusive for practical use. Superficially, this might look like the
scheme that the Supreme Court initiated with Daubert, its “factors”
constituting the proxies. Such a scheme cannot, however, create an
intelligible dichotomous standard of reliability, unless either (a) only
a single, dichotomous proxy is used, so that the expertise would be
deemed “reliable” relative to the present requirement provided the
single proxy test is passed, or (b) in the multiple proxy context, one
has a determinate way of synthesizing the results of those tests or
factor applications into a single, binary judgment without performing
an independent assessment of reliability. Pretty clearly, Daubert does
neither. Its factors cannot yield simple “yes” or “no” answers; its
formulation rejects any single factor as determinative; the opinion
expressly leaves open the possibility of additional pertinent factors;
and a fortiori it eschews any reasonably determinate means of
76
synthesizing the various factors to be considered.
Of course, the Court’s reticence does not necessarily mean that
no such reasonably determinate synthesis is possible, and at least one
eminent evidence scholar has attempted to provide such a synthesis
by listing binary conditions for a determination of reliability. Edward
Imwinkelried suggests filling out the requirement in the following
way, at least for scientific evidence:
[T]here is “enough” validation when the proponent’s foundation
establishes that an hypothesis has been verified by an empirical
study which: (1) is based on a large, representative database; (2)
was conducted under conditions approximating those in the
instant case; and (3) yielded a validity rate justifying the
definiteness of the tendered opinion.77

Like amended Rule 702, this suggestion identifies certain areas of
interest on which trial judges should focus. That is certainly helpful,
as far as it goes, but it soon throws up difficult questions: How large a
database is large enough? How representative must it be to support
this opinion? How close is close enough for the conditions to
approximate those of the litigated case? How high a “validity rate” is
high enough to justify an opinion of a given definiteness? These
76

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-52 (also
emphasizing ex ante flexibility).
77
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule Into
the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough Even
When It is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 50 (1999).
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questions cannot be understood as binary questions of the type we
are seeking here. They can only be answered by assessing what is at
risk given the degree to which these parameters are not satisfied in
the proponent’s evidence. And this means that the criteria stated
reflect, at best, conclusions of an analysis that implicitly invokes an
78
unspecified weighing algorithm.
What else might we try? We might be more modest in the goals
that a dichotomous reliability concept is expected to achieve.
Perhaps all that is necessary in the context of an admissibility decision
is the elimination of expertise that is unreliable in certain specific
ways that are amenable to dichotomous tests. For example, drawing
on the first articulated Daubert factor, suppose the gatekeeping role
consisted solely of determining whether the basis for an opinion is
testable. An expert in prayer is offered to testify that God revealed to
him during prayer that the defendant is guilty. God also revealed
during the same prayer that God will not reveal anything else to the
expert, certainly not anything that can be independently confirmed.
In such a context, the expert may be excluded on the ground that
the basis for his testimony is untestable. Use of the other Daubert
factors, suitably developed, could similarly eliminate supposed
79
expertise that is defective in particular ways.
80
This might be developed into a coherent admissibility scheme,
78

The idea might be that some kind of invisible hand mechanism, say the
accumulating experience of judges, will allow the intuitive balancing of competing
considerations without an explicit process of identifying the counterweights. This
seems to be the underlying, perhaps unintended, idea in an earlier article by
Professor Imwinkelried, from which he drew the test here quoted. See Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Judge as Daubert Gatekeeper: Adapting Old Maps to the Unfamiliar
Terrain of the “Brave New World,” PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 46 (1999), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/179630.pdf
(categorizing admissibility rulings according to an analogy with the burden of
production on the merits). But it is hard to discern the mechanism that would
produce a desirable convergence of rulings, especially in the rapidly changing arena
of expert testimony, without explicit attention to the counterweights that determine,
once the degree of reliability is assessed, how reliable is reliable enough to warrant
jury consideration in the context of the case.
79
Cf. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, at 736 n.65 (arguing that the
Daubert reliability requirement might be read to exclude only “‘subjective belief or
unsupported speculation’ and ‘inference[s] or assertion[s] [not] derived by the
scientific method,’” leaving any further oversight to be carried on pursuant to a
general balancing of probative value and counterweights, presumably via Rule 403)
(citation omitted).
80
Such an approach would, in fact, bear some similarity to the work of
philosopher Karl Popper, upon whom the Daubert Court confusingly relied. See
Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner,
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 217, 230-32 (2001) (criticizing Daubert’s reliance on
Popper, noting that under Popper’s philosophy of science, a claim or theory cannot
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but it is definitely not what Daubert mandated. For Daubert did not
simply require the exclusion of expertise that is defective in one or
more of several specified ways. It mandated that only reliable
expertise be admitted. Admission under Daubert, in its dichotomous
reliability interpretation, thus involves a judicial determination that
the expertise is reliable, not one that the expertise has not been
found to be unreliable in designated respects. Expertise that is
unreliable (or very unreliable, to put it in gradational terms), but not
in one of the articulated ways, should not come in under Daubert, but
would come in under the contemplated scheme.
The two
frameworks are not compatible.
The Downside of Dichotomy. Faced with the very difficult task of
coming up with a coherent scheme of dichotomous reliability that is
faithful to the mandates of the Supreme Court and Congress, there is
some tendency for trial judges to try instead to answer a different,
more readily answerable, but clearly dichotomous question. Courts
might, for example, treat the admissibility decision as a sufficiency
decision on the merits, excluding the proffered expertise unless it
possesses sufficient reliability to meet the burden of production, at
least to the extent the proponent bears such a burden. With
exclusion of such evidence often resulting in summary judgment or
directed verdict, it is tempting to treat the admissibility question as
determined by the answer to the sufficiency question. Indeed, there
81
is good reason to think this sort of thing is occurring.
Treating reliability as a dichotomous characteristic of expert
testimony thus reinforces a pre-Daubert trend: What some courts
really have wanted to do in certain toxic tort litigation is to rule on
the merits against the plaintiff; for want of suitable doctrinal means
of so doing directly, they struck upon the idea of excluding the
plaintiff’s critical evidence and then granting the defense summary

be known to be true or even probable, but can only be “corroborated” by failures to
falsify it).
81
Judge Kozinski’s ruling on remand in Daubert illustrates it nicely. 43 F.3d 1311,
at 1320-22 (applying the reliability test in light of California law on sufficiency of the
evidence); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 1073-74 (arguing that Daubert has
contributed to the confusion in this regard); Berger, supra note 51, at 304-06
(discussing rulings excluding expert testimony in toxic tort cases when based on
studies showing a relative risk of less than 2); id. at 322-25 (discussing doctrinal
aspects of a conflation of admissibility with sufficiency). Certain statements in
Daubert and Kumho Tire do encourage this. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153
(apparently endorsing the trial court’s assessment that the challenged expert
testimony “fell outside the range where experts might reasonably differ, and where
the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different experts, even though
the evidence is ‘shaky.’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.”).
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82

judgment. As Sam Gross has emphasized, it may well be important
to facilitate explicit preemptive determinations on the merits by
judges in cases for which the scientific evidence is overwhelmingly
one-sided, but the entrenchment of a reliability-based admissibility
83
regime is not the right way to achieve this goal. Here, as elsewhere,
the distinction between admissibility and sufficiency should be kept
clear in order to avoid confusion, mistaken rulings, and the improper
84
use of precedents.
Deciding sufficiency in the guise of admissibility might or might
not yield the same results that would occur if the admissibility and
sufficiency determinations were kept properly distinct. For example,
in deciding whether to admit one expert opinion or set of opinions
under such a sufficiency standard, if no other evidence favoring the
proponent on the disputed fact is considered, such a procedure
places an artificially high burden on the proffered expertise. It is not
clear what grounds can be offered for requiring that the expert
testimony be enough by itself to sustain the burden. Even if all other
favorable expert evidence on that disputed fact is considered in
making the sufficiency-imbued admissibility determination, the
proponent may still be disadvantaged by not having the benefit of all
85
non-expert evidence relating thereto.
Moreover, even if the trial court considers all evidence in the
case on the material issue in question (including that which the

82

See Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence: What Daubert Didn’t
Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 246-48 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996). “As
the Bendectin cases illustrate, courts do not like to admit evidence and say it’s
insufficient. Instead, they will go to unfortunate lengths to find that essential parts
are inadmissible, and then say that there’s not enough left to go to the jury.” Id. at
252.
83
Id. at 255-61. Gross identifies part of the problem as the conventional but
poorly reasoned principle of the law of sufficiency that the opinion of any qualified
expert is sufficient to sustain a verdict coinciding with the opinion. This principle
erroneously treats expert opinion as if it were just another form of direct evidence,
whereas in fact it is a form of expert-assisted circumstantial inference. Id. at 252-53.
84
See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447,
449-59 (1990) (discussing confusion of admissibility with sufficiency that has helped
to spawn the perverse doctrine of conditional relevance).
85
Replying to criticisms of the conflation of admissibility with sufficiency,
Professor Mueller argues that there is nothing wrong with excluding evidence
because it is insufficient to meet the burden of production, provided the proponent
has an adequate opportunity to advise the court about all additional evidence that
may be forthcoming on the issue. Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right
Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 987, 1001 (2003) (citing cases that illustrate such a practice). This, of course,
assumes that the court is willing to consider all such evidence, expert and nonexpert, in making its supposed admissibility ruling.
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proponent is yet to introduce), the reliability requirement still
amounts to the multiplication of events that trigger a summary
determination, unless the admissibility of all the proponent’s
expertise is decided in a single pre-trial hearing. Otherwise, with
each item of expertise offered on the issue by a party bearing the
burden of production, the opponent gets, in effect, an opportunity to
move for summary judgment. With more bites at the apple, so to
speak, such a procedure entails more cumulative probability of
summary determination, as well as more expense incurred by a
proponent who, in some cases, will be at a sizeable resource
disadvantage. It is unclear whether effectively increasing the burden
of production is an intended or appropriate consequence, but no
justification for doing so only in the presence of expert testimony has
86
been provided.
Finally, the reliability requirement must be applied to parties not
bearing a burden of production; Rule 702 does not distinguish on
this ground. The obvious example is expertise offered by a criminal
defendant to negate the prosecution’s affirmative case. If, however,
the same methodology is applied by analogy to such parties, then
their evidence may be subjected to artificially high admissibility
hurdles. Why, that is, should relevant expert testimony, unlike other
evidence offered by an accused, be excluded simply because it is not
enough to raise a reasonable doubt? Worse yet, why should it be
excluded just because similar evidence was not enough to warrant a
finding by a preponderance of the evidence in some civil case that is
cited by analogy, or because it was not enough to warrant a finding
beyond reasonable doubt when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal precedent? This can be expected once these precedents are
transmuted from sufficiency rulings into admissibility rulings.
Even worse possibilities exist. In their search for a manageable
dichotomy to substitute for a determination of sufficient reliability,
courts may try instead to determine which expert’s testimony on a
particular matter, the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s, is based on more
reliable information, excluding the loser in this comparative

86

In addition, sufficiency rulings are subject to de novo appellate review, while
many admissibility rulings—including reliability determinations under Daubert—are
subject to review only for abuse of discretion. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.6
(arguing, however, that some reliability related issues should be considered de novo).
Burying a sufficiency ruling within an admissibility ruling may thus have the effect of
insulating the former from proper appellate review. Cf. John J. Gibbons, Tenth
Anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 127 (2003) (discussing confusion in the review of admissibility rulings when
they are part of a summary or directed judgment).
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evaluation. Such a decision starts with a gradational conception of
reliability but then transposes it into a binary one by way of the
comparison. It also amounts to a decision on the merits by the trial
88
judge.
The same is true if courts presume to think noncomparatively by excluding alleged expertise that the court believes is
simply incorrect, or if they try to decide which side should win and
then admit or exclude evidence based on its propensity to produce
the “right” result. These various substitute decisions may be exactly
what some interest groups would like to see by way of tort reform, but
they are dangerous substitutions if the right to a jury trial is to be
89
preserved, indeed if the right to a trial is to be preserved at all.
Reliability and Related Gradational Attributes. Yet there is a germ of
insight in such substitute approaches. Many of the problems
associated with a binary reliability regime can be avoided if we think
in terms of comparative evaluation rather than isolated evaluation of
reliability, provided the proper comparison is made. As with the use of
analogies in substantive law, one can sometimes answer the
comparative question more easily or more coherently than the
90
isolated one. Instead of asking whether a given item or type of
proffered expertise is, relative to the suitably defined task at hand,
reliable vel non (the isolated sense), or whether it is more reliable
than that offered by the opponent (appropriately a question for the
trier of fact), we might better ask whether a given item or type of
proffered expertise is, in the context, more or less reliable than some

87

See Beecher-Monas, supra note footnote 38, at 1073 n.151 (asserting that this
confusion may occur). Once again, language can be found in Kumho Tire that would
encourage this kind of thinking. See 526 U.S. at 155 (comparing the challenged
expert’s report on certain foundational facts, concerning the remaining tire tread,
with testimony by opposing experts).
88
This possibility necessitated warnings from the drafters of the 2000
amendment: “When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert’s
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert
testimony is unreliable. The amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is
the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise.” See
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendments. The drafters did
not, however, go on to explain in what sense of “reliable” this idea can be
maintained.
89
See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1047, 1057 (2003) (stating that “a fair definition . . . is that an item of evidence
is reliable proof of a phenomenon if the existence of the evidence indicates a high
probability that the phenomenon is true” and arguing that under such a conception
of reliability, “[t]he whole notion of a trial, and indeed the whole purpose of the
factfinder, falls away if we say that a given piece of evidence can be presented to the
factfinder only if it is reliable”).
90
Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 92 (indicating the advantages of comparative
veritistic evaluation of social practices).
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alternative presentation by that party, including the possibility of
simply dropping the challenged expertise from the evidentiary mix.
To take advantage of the comparative evaluation of potential
evidence packages, however, requires an acknowledgment of the
different mode of thinking about reliability itself, for it depends, as
already noted, on the ability to say that one package is more reliable or
less reliable than another, which implicitly accepts that reliability is a
matter of degree, like “probative value” and “credibility.” In Part III,
I will suggest ways to incorporate explicitly the gradational
conception of reliability into the law of admissibility. In so doing, I
hope to further indicate that a gradational reliability concept is not
only more appealing theoretically, but also more workable in
practice.
Before doing so, however, we should pause to note that the exact
relationships among reliability, credibility, and probative value, as
these terms are used in the federal rules, are unclear. Common
usage is vague, and the terms are not authoritatively defined. For
example, expert credibility might be viewed as simply part of what
determines expert reliability, or credibility of the expert might be
91
distinguished from the reliability of the expertise itself. The latter
formulation would reserve credibility assessments for the trier of fact
by limiting reliability assessment under Rule 702 to matters unrelated
to witness credibility. That might be desirable, but the oft-expressed
concern about bias among experts suggests that the effects of bias
must be taken into account in applying the reliability screening
92
mandated by the rule.
Similarly, reliability might be considered one component of
probative value, or the two might be considered distinct. As a
theoretical matter, it has been suggested that the probative value of
an item of evidence be identified with its likelihood ratio relative to
93
the contending hypotheses in the case. If so, then one might also
91

See, e.g., BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE:
EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 7-8 (1995) (noting that the term
reliability is variously used to refer to test sensitivity, quality control, discriminatory
power, or witness honesty).
92
Bias seems to be a major concern, for example, when courts making reliability
assessments take into account whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes
of testifying.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995).
93
In general terms, the likelihood ratio for evidence, E, is the probability that
such evidence would be presented under the hypothesis of guilt (or liability),
P(E|G), divided by the probability such evidence would be presented under the
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identify reliability, or rather unreliability, as a measure of the extent
to which evidence causes divergence between the subjective
likelihood ratio of the trier of fact and (some measure of) the
objective likelihood ratio that the trier ought to attribute to that
94
95
evidence. The greater that divergence, the lower the reliability.
This suggestion seems to limit unreliability to a certain tendency to
96
mislead. But this misses an important point: evidence that is not
misleading at all, at least in the indicated sense, can nonetheless be
considered to have weak reliability; it may have a degree of
unreliability that is perfectly well understood by the decision maker
and thus reflected in its assessment of probative value. As I will argue
below, focusing exclusively on the tendency to mislead the trier of
fact, at least in the sense expressed in the suggested measure, gives
the wrong focus to the reliability concern in the context of expert
testimony.
For the purpose of developing a workable interpretation of Rule
702, therefore, it would be unwise to adopt a narrow and theoretically
specific formalization of reliability. Instead, we should work with its
unrefined—but gradational—meaning, indicating a degree of
97
dependability or trustworthiness. In comparative terms, one item of
evidence is more reliable than another if the former is more
98
dependable or trustworthy.
hypothesis of innocence (or non-liability), P(E|not-G). It is a measure of the relative
consistency of the evidence with the two contending hypotheses. See Richard
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1023-24 (1977).
94
For an interesting analysis of the idea of “objective” likelihood ratios, see Alvin
I Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 237
(2002).
95
See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 118-20 (building on the work of philosopher
Alvin Goldman).
96
Redmayne discusses various problems with this model of reliability. See id. at
120-24.
97
Cf. id. at 118 (“I think the common use of the term does have a coherent, if
unarticulated, meaning, which treats ‘reliable’ as a synonym of ‘dependable’ or
‘trustworthy.’”).
98
Professor Imwinkelried, in his comment on a draft of this Essay, chides me for
not providing a specific definition of reliability. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 282-83 (2003). To be sure, I
believe that my claim that the reliability concept in Rule 702 is better interpreted as
gradational rather than as binary (which is not the same thing as saying that it should
be understood as “relative” to the inferential task at hand, though this is also true, see
id. at 285) can be demonstrated without providing a canonical definition of
reliability. Indeed, providing such a definition is not the role of someone offering an
interpretation of an authoritative term. Such definition must be given by the courts
or by Congress. In interpreting the rule, what commentators may do is to investigate
or refine meaning, not to prescribe it. Nevertheless, in response to Imwinkelried’s
understandable query, the best that I am currently able to do in this regard is to offer
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III. TOWARD A POLICY-BASED BALANCING FRAMEWORK
In order to determine whether a differential in reliability
warrants exclusion of the less reliable, it is crucial to look not only to
the factors that affect the degree of reliability—factors that have been
explored extensively in the extant literature—but also to the factors
that would warrant the exclusion of relevant but insufficiently reliable
evidence. One commentator has written:
[C]ourts and commentators have identified the varied
considerations that determine the balance of probative value and
prejudice of scientific evidence. Applying these to various types of
scientific evidence offers a more honest and sensitive basis for
making admissibility decisions than the more cramped tests that
have characterized this area of the law of evidence.99

This assertion is, I think, largely correct, except that courts and
commentators so far have done a much better job of identifying “the
varied considerations that determine . . . probative value” than of
examining the factors related to “prejudice” that would inform the
indicated balance. The latter is a major source of our continuing
problems in understanding the reliability requirement. How then
shall we complete the analysis in such a way as to give due respect to
the teachings of the Supreme Court and the mandate of Congress in
amended Rule 702?
Avoiding Blind Alleys. Start by noting what should not be done. It
does not help, and it might hurt, to invoke the notion of a “threshold
of reliability,” above which expertise is considered acceptable in court
and below which it is not. Unfortunately, prominent scholars—even
some who disagree significantly about other aspects of expert
testimony—often agree, explicitly or implicitly, that the post-Daubert
regime rightly requires expertise to exceed such a threshold of
the following comparative conception as an interpretation of what I think lawmakers
might be groping toward: E1 is more reliable than E2, as evidence regarding
proposition X, if and only if, without regard to whether either item of evidence
favors X or not-X, but assuming (even if it is not true) that one favors X while the
other favors not-X, a rational person required to wager on the truth of the
proposition favored by E1 or that favored by E2 would bet on that which is favored by
E1. The hypothetical veil of ignorance—deciding which evidence is worth the bet
without regard to which side of the dispute it favors—represents the core of good
sense of the statement in Daubert that “the focus, of course, must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” 509 U.S. at
595. I cannot say that anything in my argument in the text depends on the precise
terms of this definition, but it may give the reader a better idea of what I have in
mind. Or not. Professor Imwinkelried’s call for a definition may actually have been
intended as a call for a formula with which to compute a real-valued measure of
reliability. Obviously, I make no attempt to provide such a formula.
99
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE , supra note 5, at 737 (footnote omitted).
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100

reliability.
Of course, if this mode of expression is understood
simply as a metaphor for the use of another analytical framework,
such as that of Rule 403, then it poses little danger, provided that
101
framework is clearly identified.
Yet, there are reasons to be
skeptical of its employment even as metaphor.
One serious problem with this method of transforming
continuous variation into dichotomous choice is that it suggests,
although it does not explicitly require, an invariant threshold that
applies across disciplines and across litigation contexts. The mental
picture is an ascending scale of reliability with a mark that separates
the insufficiently reliable from the sufficiently reliable.
The
suggestion is that the location of this mark on the scale, as
distinguished from the question of whether the particular evidence
exceeds the threshold it indicates, is identifiable, at least in principle,
without an appreciation of either the nature and type of expertise or
the alternatives to it that may exist in the context of a particular case.
This pernicious idea is essentially a resurrection, in the limited
context of expert testimony, of the now-discredited “plus-value”
102
requirement that Wigmore described for all evidence. The idea is
misleading in that it suggests that expertise can be determined to be
“sufficiently reliable” by considering only the degree of reliability,
without considering the particular counterweights that cut against
admission in context.
Indeed, even without the imagery of the uniform minimum that

100

Compare, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 77, at 42-45 (not explicitly using the
“threshold” terminology, but arguing that “when the question posed is the
sufficiency of a foundation [for an expert opinion], the issue is whether the
foundation is adequate to support the specific opinion proffered, not whether the
expert has relied on the best scientific technique available”), with David L. Faigman,
et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 645, 659, 664-65 (2000) (arguing for the use of a “better evidence”
principle, but acknowledging the idea that the post-Daubert regime requires “a
minimal threshold of reliability”).
101
Professor Faigman, in his comment on this paper, disclaims any suggestion
that the idea of a “minimum threshold of reliability” can suffice to do the work of
mapping gradational reliability into the dichotomous decision on admissibility, but
he nonetheless argues that Daubert requires “some minimal amount of testing.” The
only explanation that he provides for this, however, involves an example (prediction
by “tarot cards, tea leaves and crystal balls”) that surely would result in exclusion
under Rule 403 without any help from Rule 702. See Faigman, supra note 68, at 259.
Perhaps, then, the invocation of a “minimum threshold” by Faigman et al., supra
note 100, is really just an assertion that Rule 403 excludes purported expertise that is
so weakly probative as to be a waste of time. If so, I would agree, but that does not
speak to the interpretation of Rule 702.
102
See 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 28 (Tillers rev.
1983).
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makes the threshold imagery appealing, it remains vacuous. It
merely restates the “sufficient reliability” idea without telling us
anything affirmative about how to fill it out. Without more, one is left
to suppose that the significance of the (unidentified) counterweights
can be assessed by macroscopic gestalt, rather like identifying
103
pornography by the “I know it when I see it” test. The same would
be true of unadorned exhortations to admit only that which is
“reasonably reliable,” although this locution is less likely to call for
the invisible marker imagery. Without giving attention to the
parameters in the balance that determine whether a given degree of
reliability is reasonable for admission, any such formulation
effectively requires the judge to answer the question: “Does the
degree of reliability of the expertise outweigh?” Unless something
follows the word “outweigh,” the question is practically incoherent.
Outweigh what?
Michael Graham’s interesting attempt to resolve the reliability
104
puzzle is instructive in this regard. Professor Graham identifies two
interpretations of the reliability requirement that struggle for
recognition in the courts and that illustrate dichotomous and
gradational conceptions of reliability, although he does not use this
105
The first interpretation would require trial courts to
terminology.
determine “whether the [expert’s] explanative theory . . . produces a
106
correct, accurate, truthful, valid conclusion.”
Under the second
interpretation, trial courts would determine “whether there are
sufficient assurances present . . . that the expert witness’s explanative
107
theory produces an accurate result to warrant jury acceptance.”
The first interpretation, which Graham rightly rejects as too
108
demanding of experts and of courts, instantiates the dichotomous
approach. Graham argues for the second interpretation as more
within judicial capacities and better suited to the “‘liberal thrust’ to
admissibility of expert witness testimony that was favored by
109
Daubert.”
In doing so, he sometimes explicitly uses language that

103

The quote is from Justice Stewart’s famous concurring opinion in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
104
See Michael Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining “Reliable” Under
the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000).
105
Id. at 336-39.
106
Id. at 317.
107
Id. at 317, 339.
108
Id. at 356.
109
Id. at 356-57.
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110

accepts the gradational nature of reliability.
Now, to ask whether there are sufficient assurances of accuracy
to warrant jury acceptance (rather than jury consideration) of the
expert’s opinion or information appears on its face to fall into the
111
trap already noted of conflating admissibility with sufficiency.
But
the matter becomes less clear once one examines the details of such a
determination as conceived by Graham. An expert’s testimony would
pass his test if either the expert’s theory “has gained widespread
112
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs,” or (if neither
113
widely accepted nor widely rejected ) it “possesses particularized
114
The first prong of this test seems to
earmarks of trustworthiness.”
resurrect, modify, and extend the applicability of Frye, which may or
115
may not be a good idea.
However that may be, the idea of
demanding, in default of such widespread consensus, only
“particularized earmarks of trustworthiness” is as incomplete here as
it is in the law of hearsay and confrontation, from which it is
116
presumably drawn.
If not understood as simply instrumentally
related to a sufficiency ruling on the merits, itself problematic once
again, this idea is just another way of articulating the essentially
vacuous notion of a “threshold of reliability.” And the problem
remains: expertise cannot be known to pass a threshold—from
insufficiently reliable to sufficiently reliable—just by identifying
particularized earmarks of trustworthiness, no matter what they are
or how many of them are accumulated. Something is necessarily
missing from such an analysis; one must know, in some sense, where
the threshold is in order to know whether it has been passed. Few
would doubt the relevance of some such earmarks—presumably
along the lines of the Daubert opinion and subsequent elaborations
110

E.g., Graham, supra note 104 , at 341 n.62.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
112
Graham, supra note 104, at 340.
113
Id. at 346.
114
Id. at 340.
115
Graham acknowledges that “reliance on ‘widespread acceptance’ is subject to
the limitation that the entire field to which the explanative theory belongs does not
itself simply ‘lack[ ] reliability’.” Id. n.61. This suggests that the widespread
acceptance idea is instrumentally related to, and therefore subject to being trumped
by, other considerations in regard to what is ultimately a sufficiency determination.
116
The idea of looking for particular indications of “trustworthiness”—Justice
Blackmun’s synonym of choice for reliability (see supra note 7 and accompanying
text)—is also prominent in the law of hearsay and the prevailing
constitutionalization of hearsay in the confrontation clause. On the inadequacy of
this lore, see Richard D. Friedman, Truth and its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and
Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1999).
See also Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998).
111
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thereof—in the assessment of reliability, but once again that
assessment constitutes only one side of the balance that needs to be
considered in order to make an appropriate admissibility decision.
The blind alley into which conventional analysis has wandered is
nicely illustrated by a treatise statement made in the context of
discussing the role of Rule 403 in screening expert testimony for
reliability:
Under Rules 702 and 104(a), judges must decide whether the
proponent of scientific evidence has demonstrated the validity of
the scientific basis for the testimony by a preponderance of the
evidence. In many cases, however, while judges might find
scientific evidence to be “valid,” they might believe that it is not
valid enough, in light of the dangers associated with its use.117

I do not take issue with this statement as a description of prevailing
conceptions. My problem concerns those conceptions. While it is
certainly true that Rule 403 serves as a residual exclusionary principle
that is analytically distinct from Rule 702, the point of the discussion
in Part II is that conventional understandings of Rule 702 do not
allow for any usable, non-balancing, rule-like criterion to which Rule
403 can serve in such a capacity. Consequently, it makes no sense to
say that the validity determination can be meaningfully separated
from a consideration of the “dangers associated with [the evidence’s]
use.” Once again, the binary conception of reliability suggested by
the reference to a demonstration of validity “by a preponderance of
the evidence” tends to conceal this problem.
Connecting Reliability to Counterweights. How, then, can we
articulate a more coherent balancing analysis that gives explicit
attention to the counterweights? In fact, we can draw on a rich body
of theory about the rationale of admissibility rules, for many such
rules attempt to answer, in particular contexts, whether evidence of a
118
certain type is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.
As I have
detailed elsewhere, these rules respond to one or more of three basic
concerns: (1) that the trier of fact is prone to err in its assessment of
the probative value of certain types of evidence or in its application of
the burden of persuasion when faced with such evidence (concerns
that are expressed primarily in regard to jury trials); (2) that the
offered item of evidence will be of too little probative value to
warrant the necessary expenditure of time and resources, including
117

FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.8, at 59-60.
A similar strategy is employed, to somewhat different effect, in REDMAYNE, supra
note 5. Redmayne argues that “it is inconsistent for the English legal system to apply
reliability-based exclusionary rules to hearsay and confession evidence, while not
applying one to expert evidence.” Id. at 126.
118
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the cognitive resources of the trier of fact, necessary to incorporate it
into the decision-making process (generally of concern in both jury
and bench trials); and (3) that the trier of fact (judge or jury) should
not be forced to assess the case based on the offered evidence when
119
superior evidence is likely to be available.
The first two concerns lead to an admissibility structure that
prefers the exclusion of the challenged evidence ceteris paribus, that is,
all other evidence in the case being (hypothetically) the same. They
differ in that the first entails a much larger degree of epistemic
paternalism than the second. The third concern, however, leads to
an exclusionary structure that prefers the replacement of the offered
evidence with something else, better evidence. It reflects more the
problem of advocate control than the problem of jury control that tends
to animate the first concern. Jury credulity, after all, is not the only
potential source of inaccuracy in adjudication. Even in a bench trial,
120
the court will want the best evidence reasonably available. Indeed,
even in a trial by a panel of experts, were one to be undertaken, the
121
panel would want such evidence.
Assuming that we are to deploy a sensitivity to these traditional
concerns to interpret a “sufficient reliability” requirement, is there
anything general and affirmative that one can say about how such an
analysis should proceed? A few parameters frame the discussion to
come. We are looking for an analysis that assumes testimony by a
qualified expert that is relevant to a disputed issue and specifies an
additional requirement related to reliability. The strategy is to
develop the implications of a gradational reliability concept in the
context of each of the three concerns articulated above. We want a
standard, or set of standards, that is responsive to the concerns
119

See Nance, supra note 11, at 1554-60. The analysis sets aside rules, such as those
privileging certain confidential communications against disclosure, that rest largely
on non-veritistic concerns relating to incentives for conduct, or the protection of
relationships, outside the courtroom.
120
Id. In a series of articles, I have argued at length that the third concern is
more pronounced in the legitimate rationales of admissibility rules than
conventionally thought. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80
IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995); Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, supra note 84;
Dale A. Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the Comparative
Analysis, 76 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1992). The most general treatment is Dale A. Nance,
The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988) [hereinafter The Best Evidence
Principle].
121
Of course, a trier of fact can try to make allowances for the absence of
evidence, but this is a second best solution as compared to having the better
evidence before the tribunal. See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden
of Proof, 49 HASTINGS. L.J. 621, 633-39 (1998) (examining reasons not to rely upon
jury discounting to handle problems of evidential incompleteness).
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articulated above but not simply redundant of Rule 403.
This
presupposes that the Supreme Court did not simply intend to deliver
the message that trial courts have been improperly applying Rule 403
in the context of expert testimony. More importantly, it reflects the
general consensus that Daubert did not adopt the position advanced
most conspicuously by Dean McCormick, well before the adoption of
the federal rules, that would treat relevant testimony by a qualified
expert in a way no different from most other kinds of evidence the
admissibility of which is challenged, subjecting it to the standard
balancing of probative value against competing concerns now
123
reflected in Rule 403.
Nevertheless, because all three types of concerns identified
above can be addressed by an analysis under Rule 403, and because
analysis under that rule is at least reasonably well understood, it is
possible to use that rule as a starting point in developing the kind of
analysis needed for Rule 702. Indeed, one norm clearly serves to
distinguish the contemplated balancing test under Rule 702 from
balancing under Rule 403. Under 403, the burden is on the
objecting party to convince the trial judge that the testimony’s
124
probative value is outweighed by the indicated risks. In contrast, it
is generally agreed that the burden is on the proponent of expertise

122

A familiar principle of statutory construction is that a body of rules should be
interpreted so as not to render any one thereof wholly redundant of the others and
therefore pointless. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000).
123
For McCormick’s view, see CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 363 (1954), in which McCormick criticized Frye as more appropriately a test
for taking judicial notice. He wrote, “Any relevant conclusions which are supported
by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion. Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers
of prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of
time.” Id. at 363-64. On Daubert’s rejection of the McCormick view, see Paul C.
Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999,
2009-12 (1994), explaining that Daubert is more demanding than the standard Rule
403 analysis. See also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 203 (comparing Frye
and Daubert with McCormick’s preferred standard).
124
Nominally, Rule 403 authorizes exclusion only when probative value is
“substantially outweighed” by one of the indicated concerns. This presents a puzzle:
How can it be that we should refrain from excluding evidence the probative value of
which is outweighed by a concern, but not substantially outweighed by it? If the probative
value is outweighed by the concern, then the evidence should be excluded, should it
not? What else could it mean to say that it is “outweighed”? This puzzle afflicts all
Rule 403 jurisprudence, and the answer must be this: “substantially outweighed” is a
sloppy locution intended to mean “clearly outweighed,” so that doubts about the
balance of probative value and counterweights are resolved in favor of the
proponent. This seems to be how courts interpret the rule. See CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.9, at 190 (2d ed. 1999).
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125

to establish (sufficient) reliability under 702. One might leave it at
that, switching the allocation of the burden but otherwise
understanding the 702 reliability decision as a replication of the 403
126
balancing test. That approach would certainly simplify the problem
127
of articulating a coherent reliability test under Rule 702.
For
reasons explained below, however, I believe it is less than optimal.
Offsetting Jury Credulity. Both before and after Daubert, what has
often been stated as the primary concern warranting the exclusion of
proffered expertise of dubious reliability is the idea that a lay jury will
be misled by such evidence, giving it greater credence than it
128
deserves.
This might seem to follow from one of the defining
characteristics of expertise, that jurors lack specialized information
available to the expert. It coheres with suspicions about the
credibility of experts for hire, if it is thought that jurors are unable to
discount for the effects of bias. As is well known, Daubert itself was
decided within a climate of concern over jury credulity in the face of
129
junk science.
This view of the matter has led to perceptive criticisms of the
Court’s solution to the problem. For example, Susan Haack poses
the troubling rhetorical question: “[I]f judges need to act as
gatekeepers to exclude scientific evidence which doesn’t meet
minimal standards of warrant because juries may be taken in by flimsy
scientific evidence, how realistic is it to expect juries to discriminate
130
the better from the worse among the half-way decent?”
Such
criticisms carry undeniable force if juror credulity is the source of the

125

See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.1.2.
This is the solution favored by my colleague, Calvin Sharpe, in his comment on
this Essay. See Calvin W. Sharpe, Reliability Under Rule 702: A Specialized Application of
403, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 289, 307 (2003).
127
This approach would provide something resembling a “minimum threshold of
reliability” at least theoretically distinguishable from Rule 403. See supra note 101.
Unlike the abstract use of that phrase, however, the present suggestion (a) identifies
the counterweights that are to be assessed in context, and (b) requires a weighing of
the probative value of the evidence, as affected by the degree of its reliability, against
the identified counterweights.
128
Pre-Daubert: see, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide
Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984); Moenssens, supra note 27, at 564-67. Post-Daubert:
see, e.g., Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 53, at 974; Graham, supra note 104, at 356;
Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1875, 1878-79 (1994).
129
See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
130
Haack, supra note 80, at 233.
126
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Court’s concern.
Strikingly, however, the majority opinion in Daubert was at pains
to disavow any serious skepticism about jury competence, opining
that it is “overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury” to think
that abandonment of Frye’s general acceptance test would result in
litigation “in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
132
irrational pseudoscientific assertions.”
Although the Court was
anything but clear about why a reliability inquiry is needed, other
than to say that—needed or not—it is somehow mandated by the
language of Rule 702 (which at the time contained no explicit
reference to reliability), the Court seemed fairly clear in
133
distinguishing jury credulity as a source of its concerns. Neither the
opinion in Kumho Tire, nor the advisory committee’s explanation of
134
the 2000 amendment speaks to the contrary.
In this, the law’s promulgators were right. The available
empirical evidence points to jurors being remarkably conscientious in
their work and not demonstrably less accurate in their inferences
135
than judges. More specifically, so far we have no empirical basis to
conclude that jury credulity in over-crediting expert testimony is a
serious or pervasive problem. After a careful review of the available
studies, Neil Vidmar and Shari Diamond recently concluded simply:
“Empirical data do not support a view that juries are passive, toocredulous, incompetent, and overawed by the mystique of the
136
expert.”
131

See also Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate
About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific
“Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086-93 (1993) (maintaining that arguments
against juror competence are often intuitively implausible or logically inconsistent).
132
Daubert, 509 U.S. 595-96 (expressing confidence in the adversary system’s
ability to handle this sort of problem in most cases).
133
See Andrew Taslitz, Daubert’s Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-PlainMeaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 3, 62-65 (1995).
134
One can try to dig further. For example, in an earlier constitutional case, not
involving the interpretation of Rule 702, Justice Blackmun, the author of the
majority opinion in Daubert, made a statement that suggests a concern about jury
credulity. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an
impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words,
equates with death itself.”). But is hard to know how seriously to weight such a
statement as a proposition warranting the reliability requirement in Daubert. In any
event, we need not base interpretation of amended Rule 702 on undisclosed
concerns of the judges in Daubert.
135
See generally JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
136
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1121, 1180 (2001); see also REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 107, 109-12 (reviewing the
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Ironically, if there is distortion in jurors’ evaluation of expertise,
extant empirical studies suggest that the problem is likely to be the
opposite of what is usually assumed. It appears that jurors sometimes
undervalue complex expert testimony of relatively high probative
value, especially when its significance for the disputed issues is not
137
well explained.
Based on such results, one might argue that the
reason to exclude expertise of poor reliability is not because it will be
overvalued, but rather because contrary expertise of much greater
reliability offered by the opponent will be undervalued, leading to an
inaccurate weighing of the opposing proofs. The problems with such
an argument, however, are pretty clear: it conflates admissibility with
sufficiency and distorts the latter. It attempts to deal with a
sufficiency problem—that jurors might improperly weigh competing
evidence—by excluding evidence that is not itself subject to
demonstrated overvaluation.
And it prevents the jury from
combining the evidence of low reliability with independent evidence,
if there is any, that might be enough in combination rationally to
convince the jury. The better response to the indicated problem,
when it occurs, is to explore ways to reduce the jurors’
undervaluation of the superior expertise by improving their
138
comprehension of its significance.
The foregoing observations are consistent with, but do not
entail, the more general proposition that juries have greater difficulty
as the scientific or technical complexity of the evidence increases.
There is some limited evidence to support such a general
proposition, although the evidence is subject to various
139
interpretations. To be sure, the idea is not particularly surprising,
empirical studies and concluding that “the focus on jury competence is somewhat
misplaced”); Jacobs, supra note 131, at 1094-98 (arguing that doubts about juror
competence with respect to scientific evidence fail to take into account the growing
body of empirical evidence to the contrary).
137
See, e.g., Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation
Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match
Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002) (confirming with summoned jurors the
results of earlier research conducted mostly with students: while a few jurors seem to
make identifiable mistakes that might lead them to overvalue scientific “trace”
evidence with a quantifiable random match probability, the greatly predominant
problem seems rather to be that juries excessively discount the probative value of such
evidence).
138
See, e.g., id. (finding that variation in the manner of presenting the random
match probability affects the extent of jury undervaluation of trace evidence relative
to Bayesian norms).
139
See, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181-247 (Robert E. Litan
ed., 1993) (reviewing the available evidence and concluding (at p. 235) that “the
weight of the evidence indicates that juries can reach rationally defensible verdicts in
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for it is difficult to imagine a plausible definition or criterion of
“complexity” that would not render the proposition true to some
degree, if not tautologically so. Almost by definition, complex cases
are difficult cases. Consequently, an analogous proposition will be
true for any decision makers, including judges or panels of experts.
And even if judges’ veritistic acumen falls off less steeply than juries’
as complexity increases—which we cannot as yet conclude—that
would seem to speak to the question of the wisdom of jury trials in
complex cases, not to the question of the advisability or criterion of
140
excluding evidence.
In his present contribution Joseph Sanders tries to bridge this
gap, developing the best argument yet identified for grounding the
Rule 702 reliability determination in epistemic paternalism toward
141
the jury.
Building on the slender reed of the jury’s asserted
difficulties in complex cases, he concludes that “on balance the
empirical research does lend some support to the paternalistic
justification for restrictions on the admissibility of unreliable expert
142
testimony.” As I understand his argument, however, the most that
can be inferred from the available data is that, if judges are capable of
making the necessary discriminations (which we do not know), then
“close scrutiny of testimony [by judges] is potentially most beneficial
in complex cases where peripheral processing [by jurors] is most
143
likely.”
And Sanders acknowledges that we do not have evidence
from which to conclude that judges are capable of identifying
evidence that is “unreliable” relative to the goal of minimizing
erroneous verdicts (or the costs thereof) due to either (a) jury
misunderstanding of admitted expertise or (b) jury error induced by
144
exclusions.
complex cases”); cf. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 193 (“If there is one lesson to be drawn
from these cases, one single overarching problem revealed by the Bendectin
litigation, it is that in cases involving complex scientific evidence juries have a
difficult time reaching the truth.”).
140
Even with regard to the choice between bench trial and jury trial, such a
showing would be incomplete. If, for example, juries are much better than judges in
relatively uncomplicated cases, then juries’ reduced acumen in complex cases might
still be higher than judges’. See LEMPERT, supra note 139, at 234-35 (concluding that
there is still no evidence that judges will perform better than juries in complex
cases).
141
See Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility
of Expert Testimony, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003).
142
Id. at 938.
143
Id. at 937. “Peripheral processing” refers to the jury’s use of factors such as
credibility cues as opposed to an assessment of the rational strength of the inference
suggested by the expert. Id. at 909.
144
Id. at 937-38.
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This valiant effort, therefore, does not close the argumentative
gap. Because the evidence does not show whether such judicial
scrutiny is on balance beneficial or harmful, even in complex cases,
the claim that judicial scrutiny is “potentially most beneficial” in
certain cases is the same as saying that it is “potentially least harmful”
in such cases. In other words, at best Sanders has shown that if
judges are successfully trained to make good assessments of the
degree of reliability and exclude expertise on paternalistic grounds
when they think the evidence has low reliability (a big “if”), then the
expected benefit of such a practice increases as the degree of
complexity of the case increases, but the expected benefit (for all we
know) might not be positive over any identifiable range of complexity.
Thus, the argument necessarily falls short of a justification for a
reliability-based exclusionary practice applied in all cases involving
expert testimony.
Until we have more evidence of jury credulity, as well as more
evidence that judges are in fact capable of offsetting such
incompetence by their decisions to exclude expertise, respect for the
political significance of the jury and for those citizens who are called
to service on juries dictates that we should not readily exclude
supposed expertise on this ground. Instead, we should leave this kind
of problem to be handled under the pro-admissibility standard
articulated in Rule 403, as in fact prescribed by the majority in
145
Daubert. Indeed, before excluding evidence on this ground, courts
should at least consider and rule out less drastic remedies such as
146
judicial comment on the evidence.
Monitoring Adversarial Presentations. Much more prominent in
the Daubert and Kumho Tire opinions is a concern about regulating
the introduction of expert testimony so that it will properly assist the
147
trier of fact.
The question is how excluding proffered expert
testimony can be of assistance, if the concern is not about juror
credulity. Obviously, expertise that is very unreliable may be
excluded under Rule 403 as simply a waste of time. This is not an
insignificant limitation on the use of experts, given the far-fetched
proffers that occasionally find their way into courtrooms. But the
145

509 U.S. at 595; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746-47 (3d
Cir. 1994) (per Becker, J.) (accepting that Daubert altered prior law in the circuit by
taking consideration of the danger of overwhelming or confusing the jury out of the
Rule 702 analysis and committing it to the Rule 403 analysis); FOSTER & HUBER, supra
note 38, at 207-09 (noting that Rule 403 is the appropriate tool for dealing with
problems of jury credulity).
146
See Friedman, supra note 89, at 1064.
147
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149, 156; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 592, 593.
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question here is whether we can go further to find exclusionary
principles that are more demanding than this obvious time-saving
148
norm. What is there in expert testimony that might call for such a
heightened burden?
I am inclined to believe that the answer lies in the greater
manipulability of such evidence, as compared to most non-expert
testimony. The supply of non-expert testimony, limited as it is by the
149
requirement of first-hand or “personal” knowledge, tends to be
fixed by the litigated events. Typically, only a small number of
persons will have witnessed the events being litigated. For practical
purposes, expert testimony knows no such limitation. When a matter
is thought by counsel to be amenable to expert assistance, there are
often numerous specializations and hundreds or thousands of
practitioners thereof who might be called to testify. Data can often
be gathered and experiments can sometimes be conducted in
anticipation of trial. Put simply, expert testimony is produced in a way
that most non-expert testimony is not, coaching of lay witnesses
150
notwithstanding.
And there are obvious and powerful distorting
and biasing forces at work in this production process, much of which
151
occurs after the events being litigated and with an eye toward trial.
The implication is that greater judicial management or
monitoring of evidence might be needed in this context in order to
prevent adversarial incentives from undermining the accuracy of
trials. To be clear, this implication derives not so much from a
concern that jurors cannot or do not rationally take these process
considerations into account, but rather from the view that they
should not be required to do so when a better alternative can be
found. The next two sections examine possible arguments for
intervention in the adversarial exchange on reliability grounds,
suggesting how such interventions might be structured to assist the
148

I put aside the intensely skeptical suggestion that would exclude all conflicting
expert testimony before the trier of fact because neither a judge nor a jury has the
background to decide between conflicting experts, a suggestion that can only be tied
to some sort of court appointed expert system. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51-56 (1901).
The suggestion may have some merit, but it exceeds the scope of my present inquiry.
149
See FED R. EVID. 602, 701.
150
See RICHARD O. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1013-16 (3d
ed. 2000).
151
One need not embrace an extreme fact skepticism to see in these phenomena
the ability to undermine verdict accuracy. See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 5-35
(discussing “case construction” using forensic science in criminal cases). To be sure,
concerns about experts for hire being especially prone to distort their testimony are
probably exaggerated, at least in civil cases, given the market mechanisms that will
influence experts. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS IN LEGAL THEORY 401-04 (2001).
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trier of fact.
Marshaling Cognitive Resources. One plausible line of argument
begins with the idea of helping the trier of fact (whether judge or
jury) to focus its attention—its cognitive resources—on the most
reliable forms of expertise offered by each side on a disputed issue.
When multiple proffers of expertise address a single issue, one tool to
be considered is to remove from the trial the least reliable evidence
offered by a party on that issue.
Suppose, for example, that a party needs to prove the value of a
vacant parcel of land. The party offers several different forms of
expertise that relate to the question. One is a survey of prices at
which twenty vacant parcels, of identified acreage, within a mile of
the subject parcel were sold. The opponent raises questions about
the methodology of the survey. The proponent also offers the
testimony of three experienced realtors who have visited the subject
parcel and made “gestalt” assessments based only on their visits (and
their experience) and not, for example, on the information
contained in the survey of prices. Each “gestalt expert” places the
per-acre value of the disputed land at a figure higher than the
average per acre figure from the survey. The opponent also raises
questions about the reliability of such gestalt assessments. In such a
case, it would be plausible, depending on the details of the
challenges raised, for a trial court to conclude that the survey of
prices is substantially more reliable, as a measure of the value of the
disputed parcel, than the gestalt testimony. The court might then
assist the trier of fact by excluding the latter, forcing the parties to
focus, before the jury, on the details of the challenge to the reliability
152
of the survey.
How would this be of assistance? If we put aside the possibility of
distortion due to jury credulity, why would not the jury always be
better off with more relevant information rather than less, subject to
the limits of cumulativeness? It may be difficult for lawyers or
experts, accustomed in their reflective moments to an all-thingsconsidered, use-every-piece-of-available-information type of decision

152

An alternative resolution might be to insist, as a condition of admissibility, that
the “gestalt” witnesses make less subjective appraisals by incorporating the survey
data in the basis of their opinions. This kind of response is addressed in the
following subsection. Another possibility, of course, is that the gestalt witnesses
might be considered to be so weakly reliable as to make consideration of them a
waste of time and inadmissible under Rule 403. It is, of course, difficult to come up
with an example for which the application of Rule 403 is incontestable, so for present
purposes, assume that the gestalt witnesses would not be properly excluded pursuant
to Rule 403.
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making, to accept the possibility that “less is more” in the adjudicative
context. Yet there are reasons to entertain the idea. Decision theory
has shown that sometimes basing decision on only selected features
of a decision environment can be as successful or more successful,
and less costly in time and other resources, than a more nuanced
153
decision scheme that takes all pertinent factors into account. Even
restricting consideration to a single factor can be remarkably
154
accurate if that factor is the best single factor for the decision.
These findings present at least the possibility of a strategy that can
generate improvements in the accuracy of verdicts as well as a
reduction in the cost of trials. Such a strategy would give concrete
meaning to that portion of the Daubert opinion that rejects the need
to have as complete and wide-ranging debate on the matters
155
addressed in litigation as is needed in the scientific process.
Unfortunately, the efficacy of particular decision heuristics is
context dependent. To work well, a simple decision heuristic must
take advantage of information structures in particular decision
156
environments. At this point, we have no experiments or empirical
studies that can establish how this plays out in the context of
adversarial trials. For the time being, therefore, a trial judge would
best approach the problem by placing herself in the position of the
jury and asking whether the challenged expertise is so unreliable, in
comparison to other expertise offered by the same party, that the
judge would ignore the challenged proffer if she were the trier of fact.
This viewpoint takes advantage of any applicable decision heuristics
153

See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART
(1999).
154
Id. at 73-168 (discussing the “Take the Best” heuristic).
155
Justice Blackmun wrote:
It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and
scientific analyses. Yet there are important differences between the
quest of truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration
of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually
be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that
are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching
a quick, final, and binding judgment—often of great importance—
about a particular set of events in the past.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
156
The successfulness of a heuristic depends on its “ecological rationality,” the
domain-specific match between the heuristic and the information environment in
which it is employed. See Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 38, 46-48 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten
eds., 2001).
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available to the judge to economize cognitive resources. In jury trials,
it also helps to prevent slipping into a consideration of jury credulity,
since it is unlikely that the judge will consider herself to be subject to
irrational overvaluing of the challenged evidence. This viewpoint is
one of representation: The trial judge represents the jury, whose silence
cannot operate to exclude evidence that its members would consider
157
comparatively too unreliable to be of use.
Here, then, is one place where the stricter demands of Daubert,
Kumho Tire, and Rule 702 might be put into effect. As noted above,
conventional wisdom is that the effect of these developments is to
158
place the burden on the proponent to establish “reliability.”
Applying this idea here, if the trial judge concludes that the
challenged expertise is discernibly less reliable than other expertise
offered by the proponent, then the burden would rest on the
proponent to convince the judge that it would be a mistake to ignore
the challenged expertise because its consideration will materially
assist the trier of fact to render an appropriate verdict within the
constraints imposed by the process of trial. Doubt on the matter
would be resolved in favor of exclusion, reversing the burden as
159
compared to Rule 403.
Distinguishing this analysis from that of
Rule 403 would help to maintain the representational viewpoint
160
described earlier.
Despite this default principle favoring exclusion, an important
limitation of the present analysis is that it presupposes there is
expertise of discernibly superior reliability offered by the proponent
of the challenged evidence. Sometimes no such judgment is possible.
For example, returning to our land appraisal case, suppose the
proponent’s experienced realtors base their otherwise gestalt
appraisals on an unusual characteristic of the parcel not shared by
the twenty parcels included in the survey of sale prices. In such a

157

Cf. The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120, at 291 (suggesting a broader use
of the representative perspective).
158
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
159
This would reverse the argumentative burden only when items of expertise of
significantly different reliability are involved. If, for example, the opponent’s
complaint is simply that too many witnesses are offered to testify to the same effect,
then the burden would remain on the opponent, under Rule 403, to convince the
judge that proffered witnesses would be cumulative.
160
To provide notice to the proponent and to sharpen the issues, the opponent
should have the initial burden of providing a reason to think that the challenged
expertise is less reliable than other expertise offered by the proponent on the point.
But then the proponent would have to surmount the persuasive hurdle for the
challenged expertise to be ruled not inadmissible on this ground. Fed. R. Evid.
104(a) would govern the determinations, as indicated in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
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case, a trial judge might properly conclude that both types of
evidence should be considered by the trier of fact. The important
point, in any event, is that the assessment should proceed not in
terms of whether a particular proffer is sufficiently reliable or
reasonably reliable, considered by itself, but rather whether the
proponent’s package of expertise on the issue is as reliable, and thus
as helpful to the jury, as it might be if narrowed by the exclusion of
some of what is offered. The comparative nature of the evaluation is
161
crucial.
There is a further implication, one that will not sit well with
those who see in the reliability requirement a quick route to summary
judgment. If the challenged testimony is the only expertise offered by
a party on the disputed fact, the judge would not be warranted in
excluding it, at least not under the theory posited. For example, in
our hypothetical real estate appraisal case, if the proponent
presented only the gestalt witnesses, they could not be excluded in
the interest of marshaling cognitive resources. The reason for this
limitation is that the present rationale of exclusion is to assist the jury
in focusing on the best expertise each party has on the issue. With no
other expertise on the proponent’s side, there is nothing presented
with which to make a comparative reliability assessment except the
expertise, if any, offered by the opponent. To use that as the basis for
comparison would be, for practical purposes, to address the merits of
the case. Consequently, if the party’s only expertise on the matter is
to be excluded, it would have to be done on some other ground, such
as to avoid mistakes due to jury credulity or to avoid wasting the jury’s
time with very unreliable expertise—each of which would require
meeting the more demanding (for the opponent) standard of Rule
403—or to induce the proponent to present better expertise, about
which more follows in the next section.
It is important, therefore, not to overstate the impact of
adopting the foregoing analysis as compared to a scheme that would
dispose of a separate reliability inquiry under Rule 702 and leave such
matters to be handled under Rule 403.
Obviously, some

161

The demands of this analysis may not be circumvented by a proponent’s
gratuitous inclusion of extremely weak expertise that would otherwise not have been
submitted, on the theory that its exclusion under the analysis suggested here would
leave the proponent’s other evidence untouched. That will not work, since the
principle discussed in this section may be iterated; with the strategically inserted
expertise out of the way, the court could proceed to test the proponent’s next
weakest evidence as if the subterfuge had not taken place. There would be,
therefore, no incentive for a proponent to throw in sacrificial junk expertise, unless
of course some judges systematically misapplied the principle suggested here.
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comparatively unreliable expert testimony could and would be
excluded under Rule 403 anyway. Still, the suggested analysis might
effectively, if marginally, narrow the scope of offered expertise in a
way that would assist the trier of fact to focus on the best expert
evidence offered by each side. Whether the limited veritistic gain to
be derived from such a marshaling of cognitive resources is worth the
added complexity in the reliability inquiry is difficult to assess a priori.
I have stated the case for such an exclusionary principle as well as I
can. Nevertheless, I am skeptical that this is the kind of reliability
inquiry for which we are searching.
My skepticism derives from three main considerations. First,
relying (as we must, for the time being) on the trial judge’s intuitions
about what will facilitate cognitively economical decision-making
might produce as much heuristic error as it does veritistic
improvement. Judges, after all, are not immune from cognitive
162
illusions.
There is, moreover, considerable controversy among
those who study the accuracy of human decision-making about the
163
And, as
usefulness of commonly employed decision heuristics.
noted above, none of the extant research speaks directly to the
question of selection of evidence, expert or otherwise, in an
adversarial trial setting where admissibility decisions are separated
from evaluations of evidentiary weight. Because heuristics can be
relatively successful or not, depending on the particular decision
environment, it is hard to say with any confidence that significant
improvement will result from a practice in which judges exclude the
least reliable expertise that a party offers.
Relatedly, one might question whether it is necessary to exclude
evidence to achieve the contemplated benefits, assuming they are
non-trivial. Will not the trier of fact employ its own heuristics,
placing its serious attention on the subset of admitted expertise that
164
will allow it to render a reasonably accurate and prompt verdict?
This is possible, and to the extent that it is true, the exclusion of
162

There is evidence, for example, that judges are subject to heuristic errors such
as anchoring and hindsight bias. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (reporting the results of a study of 167 federal
magistrate judges).
163
Compare Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting a relatively pessimistic assessment), with
GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 153 (presenting a more optimistic assessment).
164
The evidence that ordinary people actually employ particular “fast and frugal”
heuristics that have been theoretically identified and tested is as yet sketchy. Peter
M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds, in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY, supra note 156, at 63-67.
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expertise serves primarily to streamline trials and potentially improve
accuracy by saving the cognitive resources that would be devoted by
the trier of fact to selecting those forms of expertise that should
receive more detailed attention. On the other hand, what is saved in
165
terms of the jury’s time could be lost in terms of the judge’s time.
Perhaps future research will shed light on these matters in a way that
will make the potential benefits less speculative.
The third consideration relates to the workability of the
exclusionary principle and arises primarily from the asymmetry that
the proposed structure would put in place. Suppose, for example, in
our hypothetical property valuation case, that the plaintiff’s gestalt
witnesses are excluded because she has presented more reliable
survey evidence as well; the trial judge believes that the gestalt
witnesses will only be distracting. Suppose, then, that defendant
offers its own gestalt witnesses as its only expertise on the issue. As
indicated above, the present principle of exclusion would not be
available upon plaintiff’s objection, with the consequence that
defendant would be able to introduce expertise with the same or a
lesser degree of reliability as that which was foreclosed to the plaintiff
upon defendant’s objection. Many, including a party in the plaintiff’s
situation, will consider this result unfair. This sense of unfairness, to
the extent that it is well-founded, will be largely attributable to
166
concerns about the way that a jury will react to the situation. There
is a danger that the jury will (rationally!) draw a negative inference
from plaintiff’s failure to present counter evidence in the form of
gestalt witnesses, or something similar thereto, witnesses who, by the
trial court’s admission thereof, have been seemingly certified as
167
reliable enough to warrant the jury’s consideration.
165

As a further factor, it is possible that without judicial assistance in winnowing
the evidence to be considered, the jury might feel obligated to neglect its own
common sense in favor of a searching consideration of every item of evidence
admitted, an effort that could be distracting. But this remains highly conjectural.
166
In a bench trial, the plaintiff will have substantial solace in the fact that the
trial judge has already gone on record in ruling survey evidence more reliable than
gestalt witnesses.
167
Scholars have discussed the idea that jurors may be misled when they expect to
receive evidence that a party has tried unsuccessfully to introduce. See generally Bruce
A. Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How the Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699, 699-704 (1992); Stephen Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of
Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 1011 (1978). Empirical evidence confirms that negative inferences from
missing evidence can occur. See, e.g., Bettyruth Walter, The Civil Juror: A Research
Project Sponsored by the Roscoe Pound Foundation, in GUINTHER, supra note 135, at 285,
313; Tina M. Webster et al., Voices from an Empty Chair: The Missing Witness Inference
and the Jury, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 39-41 (1991).
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There are a number of possible solutions to this kind of
problem, including informing the jury that the judge excluded some
of plaintiff’s offered expertise and the reasons therefor, or allowing
the plaintiff to use her gestalt witnesses in rebuttal once the
defendant has “opened the door” to such. But these solutions entail
some extension of the jury’s consideration to the very evidence the
exclusion of which was supposed to streamline the trial. To be sure,
this kind of problem will not arise in all cases affected by the
168
exclusionary principle articulated, but its potential reduces the
overall benefit to be derived by adding the complexity of a test based
on marshaling of cognitive resources.
For the time being, then, the most that Rule 702 should do, in
the name of marshaling cognitive resources, is to reverse the burden
of Rule 403 regarding whether a proponent’s evidence is sufficiently
reliable as not to constitute a waste of the tribunal’s time and
resources. Upon objection, the proponent would be required to
show that this balance clearly favors admission. Even if a more
discriminating exclusionary structure like that discussed above is
premature, the trial judge under this simpler framework might at
least be sensitive to the importance that the judge as trier of fact
would attribute to the various items of expertise offered by the same
proponent and to any rational heuristics the judge would employ as
trier of fact.
This simplified structure, however, would pose greater risk of the
exclusion of all of a party’s expertise, as its potential reach extends to
even the party’s most reliable expertise. This in turn presents again
the risk of judicial misuse of Rule 702 to exclude expertise when, and
just because, the opposing expertise is more reliable. And it is
problematic whether judges would be able to maintain the distinction
between this analysis and the pro-admissibility standard that, I have
argued, is appropriate when jury credulity is the expressed concern.
It would be easy to slide from a consideration of what would be useful
to the judge (and therefore to the jury) to what would be useful to the
judge but not to the more gullible jury. Consequently, while this
framework might be workable, I remain skeptical. I would rather
leave the matter to the conventional Rule 403 analysis, with the
burden of argument on the opponent of the expertise, until such
time as a more discriminating framework becomes warranted by the
empirical evidence.
168

The defendant in the example might not attempt to introduce pure gestalt
witnesses, but might instead offer one or more witnesses whose expertise is not
discernibly less reliable than the survey evidence admitted for the plaintiff.
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Securing Better Evidence. One exclusionary principle remains.
Much more important in articulating a meaningful content for the
reliability requirement of Rule 702, and more likely to result in the
exclusion of proffered expertise, is the idea that evidence may be
excluded to encourage the presentation of better evidence, evidence
that is more probative or less costly for the tribunal, or otherwise
presenting a more favorable balance between the two. This idea is
169
170
present in a wide variety of rules, including Rule 403. Here again,
we may ask whether the “produced” nature of expert testimony
requires that a heavier burden be placed on a proponent thereof
than is imposed by Rule 403 in this and other contexts. The postDaubert reliability requirement arguably entails an affirmative answer.
An illustration can be found in the regulation of the use of
pretrial experiments:
In passing on the admissibility of pretrial experiments, courts
often assert that the experiment must be “substantially similar” to
the conditions of the litigated event. However, what constitutes
substantial similarity is all but impossible to discern from the case
law without inquiring into the possibility that a better experiment
could have been done. The best explanation of the results in
these cases seems to be that “whenever the marginal benefits of a
more refined experiment do not exceed the marginal costs, and
the experiment is probative, the substantial-similarity requirement
should be deemed satisfied.”171

Several distinguished scholars have recognized the pertinence of this
kind of consideration in implementing the reliability requirement for
expert testimony, emphasizing that courts need to be demanding
consumers of expertise, especially those kinds of expertise that find
172
I
their reason for existence in the demand for expert testimony.
169

For example, secondary evidence of the contents of a document is excluded in
preference for the original, FED. R. EVID. 1002. For numerous other examples, see
the articles cited supra note 120.
170
One factor a court should consider in deciding whether to exclude evidence
challenged under Rule 403 is the “availability of other means of proof.” FED. R. EVID.
403 advisory committee’s note. This is amply demonstrated by the decision in United
States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), holding that in some circumstances evidence
of prior crimes offered by the government may be excluded in favor of a stipulation
to the conviction when the stipulation involves no less legitimate probative value but
less prejudicial potential than the proffered evidence.
171
Faigman et al., supra note 100, at 654 (footnotes omitted).
172
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-3.5.1. The matter was debated in recent
issues of the Case Western Reserve Law Review. See Faigman et al., supra note 100;
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural Framework,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000); Imwinkelried, supra note 77. The important
point to be derived from this exchange is that the better evidence idea need not be
taken as entailing some strict hierarchy of types of evidence, whether expert or
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would go further: this kind of consideration represents the primary, if
not exclusive argument structure appropriate for the reliability
inquiry of Rule 702. For want of a better alternative structure, the
principal question here is whether this consideration can be
elaborated into a workable framework for decision. In the following
paragraphs, I briefly explore the parameters of such a framework.
The most important consideration, once again, is the viewpoint
to be adopted by the judge when making the decision. The judge
should ask whether a reasonable jury, sensitive to the delays and costs
associated with a demand for more reliable expertise, would express
such a preference. Once again, the judge acts to facilitate good
inferences by speaking on behalf of the silent jury, not to channel the
jury’s inferences out of suspicion of jury credulity. On behalf of the
jury, the judge will want the best evidence that is or should have been
reasonably available, with due regard to the adversarial structure of
the trial, in knowledge of which the trial judge has a distinct
173
comparative advantage relative to the jury.
One very important consequence is the negative implication of
the principle: when contemplated alternative expertise is not
discernibly more reliable, or when such discernibly more reliable
expertise is not reasonably available to the proponent, either because
it is impossible to acquire or because the costs of its acquisition would
be disproportionate to the stakes involved, this principle provides no
exclusionary authority. The best that is reasonably available should
be admitted, at least so far as the reliability requirement of Rule 702
is concerned. Beyond that, an important limiting principle again
places the better evidence idea within an adversarial context.
Specifically, when the discernibly more reliable expertise is
reasonably available to the opponent to present if the opponent should
deem it worthwhile, then no exclusion of evidence is warranted; in
most cases adversarial incentives should suffice to provide the
174
necessary assistance to the jury.
Thus, upon a challenge that
otherwise, but can, and in this context should, involve a context-dependent
assessment of what can be gained by excluding proffered evidence. See Dale A.
Nance, Conditional Probative Value and the Reconstruction of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
94 MICH. L. REV. 419, 454-56 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of this distinction
in the context of doctrines supposed to rest on the concept of conditional
relevance).
173
That is part of the reason that it is sub-optimal to leave the question of whether
better evidence is reasonably available to the jury’s evaluation of evidential weight.
Of course, the more important reason not to leave the matter to the jury is that the
jury can be assisted by having the better evidence. See supra note 121.
174
For the unusual case in which the more reliable expertise, although available
to the opponent (thus making exclusion of proponent’s less reliable expertise
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identifies the potentially better evidence that should be brought to
bear and convinces the trial judge that such evidence is not
reasonably available to the challenger, the proponent would bear the
burden of convincing the trial judge that such evidence either is not
significantly more reliable or is not reasonably available to the
proponent. Once again, it is this placement of a burden on the
proponent, coupled with the facilitative judicial viewpoint explained
above, that serves to distinguish the reliability inquiry of Rule 702
from the somewhat similar balancing test of Rule 403.
In order to be more concrete, and to indicate qualifications to
the foregoing general principles, it is necessary to distinguish two
contexts in which an objection might be raised. As a general
proposition, expert testimony can be divided into two components,
each of which might be subject to a reliability challenge: (a) the noncase-specific information or general explanatory theory or technique
that is to be conveyed or applied—essentially the matters addressed
by Rule 702(1) & (2); and (b) the application of such information to
the specifics of the litigated case, usually by presenting an opinion—
175
addressed by Rule 702(3). When an objection based on the better
evidence idea is raised with regard to the first component, the issue
concerns whether or not to expand the informational or theoretical
resources brought to bear on the case. The potential costs thereof
are greater than when the objection concerns the form or content of
the expert’s opinion. A problem with the latter can be corrected with
relatively little cost by adjusting the expert’s testimony. While the
opponent may be able to induce concessions on cross-examination as
to the weakness of a particular opinion, there is sometimes
considerable inconvenience to the jury, and no compelling need, to
176
require such a delay. The following subsections consider these two
contexts in more detail.
— Testimonial Form and Content. Current practice is often overly

unwarranted), is not presented by either side, the trial court retains the option of
seeking court-appointed expert assistance. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
175
In the interests of both accuracy and uniformity, the deference to trial court
discretion mandated by General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997), in terms
of the standard of appellate review, should be construed to apply only to the latter,
and even in the latter context, some issues may transcend the particular case and
require rulings as a matter of law that are reviewed de novo. See Saks, supra note 39, at
231-35.
176
The same point lies behind the exclusion of lay opinion in favor of more
concrete factual reports. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 11
(characterizing the modern lay opinion rule as a rule of excusable preference that is
enforced notwithstanding the opportunity of an opponent to develop the more
concrete facts on cross-examination).
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generous to proponents in allowing opinions on case-specific
material facts, ultimate or not, when those facts are not within the
personal knowledge of the expert. Although Rule 704 rightly swept
177
away the per se exclusion of opinions on ultimate issues, courts have
failed adequately to heed an important caveat to that change:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so
as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must
be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion
of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely
tell the jury what result to reach . . . .178

Overly generous allowance of opinions on such ultimate issues is a
major contributing cause of many perceived problems in the use of
179
experts.
Modern developments in forensics theory point the way to
improvements in conventional practice consistent with the better
evidence inquiry. Specifically, it would be better to require an expert,
whenever practicable, to frame testimony in a way that effectively
communicates a likelihood ratio for the case-specific facts to which
180
the expert’s explanatory theory applies.
If the data are not
available that would allow quantitative or even qualitative measures of
the likelihood ratio, then the expert, again to the extent practicable,
should be limited to providing specialized information that the jury
can use to reach its own, typically intuitive sense of the likelihood
181
ratio. Such restriction of testimony recognizes that, for the expert
to give an opinion on an ultimate issue, the expert must implicitly
weigh the other evidence in a case, including evidence that goes
182
beyond any expert’s asserted expertise.
177

See FED. R EVID. 704 (now prohibiting opinions on ultimate issues only in the
context of testimony regarding the mental state or condition of a criminal
defendant).
178
FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note.
179
See Risinger, supra note 73, at 767 (citing generous treatment of ultimate issue
opinions as well as liberal rules of evidentiary sufficiency).
180
Of course, the best way to communicate a likelihood ratio, when it can be at
least partly quantified, is a difficult matter. See, e.g., Nance & Morris, supra note 137
(investigating different presentation formats for evidence with a quantifiable random
match frequency); Samuel Lindsey, et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 147 (2003) (investigating additional formats).
181
Some such developments are indeed occurring, in areas such as handwriting
identification. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE
ISSUES § 3-1.4.3 (2002) (discussing post-Kumho cases in which courts have admitted
expert testimony about similarities in handwriting but excluded the expert’s opinion
on the identity of the writer).
182
See Richard Friedman et al., Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet Exchange,
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It would unduly prolong this paper to explain these positions in
detail, and with the necessary qualifications. It implicates the
recurring dilemma of whether expert testimony should provide
appropriate education for the jury or, instead, provide simply the
occasion for the jury to defer to the opinions of the more credible
183
expert. But at least I can say this: If an expert’s opinion is rejected
under Rule 702 (as distinct from Rule 403) on the ground that it goes
too far beyond what the foundational facts and principles would seem
to warrant, that rejection should not be justified on the ground that
the proffered opinion is “unwarranted,” while a more conservative
opinion is “warranted,” except insofar as this is taken as an indirect
way of saying that the more conservative opinion is better warranted
within the scope of the expertise than the opinion originally
184
proffered.
A second, surely less controversial application of preferential
regulation of the form of testimony provides the most plausible
argument for a certain deference to non-legal institutional norms.
When an expert witness asserts, explicitly or implicitly, that the basis
for his testimony is a body of knowledge that meets the standards of
some discipline, then it is only fair to hold the witness to such
standards. Thus, a witness who claims his field is “scientific” may
43 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 94, 98 (2002) (indicating my arguments regarding this point in
the context of fingerprint evidence). See generally ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra note
91, § 4.4 (arguing that experts ordinarily should not give opinions on the ultimate
issue or any material fact in a case not directly observed by the expert, but should
rather provide testimony that communicates the strength of the evidence to which
their expertise relates by providing its likelihood ratio).
183
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). This, of course, is also a
matter of degree, not a categorical choice. See Allen, supra note 51, at 1160 n.9.
Educational presentations should be preferred over ones that merely invite
deference except to the extent that the nature of the expertise makes this
impracticable. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional
Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 2-2.2
to 2.3 (expressing preference, ceteris paribus, for “summarizational” expertise over
“translational” expertise).
184
Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 100, at 44-45 (describing the more aggressive
opinion, prone to a higher error rate, as unsupported by its foundation). The acid
test would be presented by a case in which the more aggressive opinion comes from
an unavailable expert declarant who based his opinion on non-replicable
observations and whose opinion is presented as hearsay not excluded as such. Under
the binary approach, an unwarranted opinion does not become warranted by the
declarant’s being unavailable and the test being non-replicable. Under my
comparative preference approach, such hearsay would not be inadmissible by virtue
of the reliability requirement of Rule 702 as adumbrated in this section. Cf. 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 18 (arguing that lay opinions from
unavailable hearsay declarants should be exempt from a preference for more
concrete facts that would apply if the declarant testified).
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properly be held (in part) to standards of the scientific community,
to the extent they can be identified. This is no small problem:
A large element of politics drives many ostensibly scientific
findings. The quality of much of the science that is urged on
courts is, to put it mildly, weak. In fact, it is not science at all.
Many claims to science are really assertions of policy wrapped in
the guise of science.185

In such contexts, a consideration of scientific standards of reliability
is appropriate, but even here it will only rarely be a binary
determination. Rather, the degree of scientific validity in fact present
will matter as part of the process of comparing the probative value of
the offered testimony and its tendency to mislead with that of a more
186
modest testimonial assertion. And this is true even if, but for such
an assertion by the proponent, the standards of the scientific
community are not those that the law should embrace as pertinent to
the litigation. For example, even if the law in a particular context
need not demand the level of certainty associated with conventional
scientific standards of statistical significance (e.g., a 95% confidence
187
level), an expert who falsely presents to the jury as working with
knowledge that does meet that standard should ordinarily not be
allowed to attempt in this way to mislead the trier of fact. This,
however, also explains why a more modest claim by the expert witness
188
might rationally lead to admission of the testimony.
The point is
not to exclude expertise just because it is not scientifically sound,
whatever that may mean, but rather to assure that the testimony is as
helpful to the trier of fact as it can be, whether the testimony is
commonly regarded as scientific or not.
Attributing such significance to the expert’s assertions is
189
reasonably compatible with both Daubert and Kumho Tire.
The
185

FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 71; see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 38, at 209-24
(illustrating rhetorical strategies used by parties and their experts in an effort to
misrepresent the available scientific knowledge).
186
Reference to a tendency to mislead does not mean that we have moved back
into the realm of jury credulity as the grounds of exclusion. The concern here is
with the attempt to mislead. There is no need to countenance such attempts, even if
they are only rarely or never successful. See The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 120,
at 291-92.
187
See supra note 51.
188
See FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 77.
189
The idea of invoking the deferential form of the Daubert inquiry only in
situations in which the expert asserts a scientific basis has been “in the air” at
conferences, but I am unable to attribute the idea to its originator. It would appear
to be a position taken in print by Professor Michael Saks. See Saks, supra note 39, at
237-38 (“The particular regime for scrutinizing ‘scientific expert testimony’ detailed
in Daubert emerged because that was the type of asserted expertise before the Court.”)
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opinion in Daubert emphasized somewhat ambiguously that its
deference to norms of scientific validity was premised on the “nature
190
of the expertise offered” in that case, and stated its holding only in
the context in which a trial judge is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert
191
scientific testimony.”
And the concern expressed in Kumho Tire,
that the existence of a reliability requirement not depend on the
category at issue, is not seriously implicated in relying on the expert’s
assertions. It is one thing to require trial judges to categorize all
expertise as scientific or non-scientific, independent of the witness’s
192
claims; it is another to hold the expert to the standards that the
expert asserts underlies the testimony. Furthermore, a witness
cannot escape all reliability scrutiny just by disclaiming any scientific
193
or other methodological basis.
Regardless of assertions, such
expertise would have to satisfy the reliability requirements described
in the following paragraphs.
—Testimonial Bases. With regard to the general data, techniques,
and theories brought to bear by the expert—the issues addressed by
Rule 702(1) & (2)—in a very real sense the question is not about
excluding anything; it is about including something. That is,
exclusion of proffered expertise, under this prong of the analysis,
would have the purpose of expressing a preference for the proponent
to expand the data considered by the court, or to include an
additional, more reliable technique, and so forth. Importantly, once
that additional information is presented, if it is, the exclusionary
principle here expressed loses its point, and the originally challenged
testimony, if not inherently altered by the addition, may be
194
admissible. For example, if a civil plaintiff in a toxic tort case offers
structure-activity and in vitro studies, and the court is considering
excluding the plaintiff’s evidence in order to express a preference for
epidemiological evidence of human teratogenicity, there would then
(emphasis supplied).
190
509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
191
Id. at 592. The ambiguity is that the Court might mean either (1) that the
proponent happened to offer evidence that the Court regards as scientific, or (2)
that the proponent happened to offer evidence as scientific.
192
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151 (“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of
questions to certain kinds of experts.”)
193
This was a dangerous trend in the wake of Daubert and before Kumho Tire. See
id. at 237.
194
While this may seem counterintuitive, it is actually a familiar admissibility
structure. Cf. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1190
(Chadbourn rev. 1972) (noting that preference for original under original
document rule is exhausted by introduction of original, so that copy may then be
admitted, even to prove contents of the document, subject only to other rules).
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be no point in excluding the challenged evidence under the present
analysis if the indication is that such preferred evidence will be
195
introduced, whether by plaintiff or defendant.
When it is not clear to the court that the preferred evidence has
been or will be presented without excluding that which is proffered,
exclusion is appropriate on this theory only when more reliable
expertise is (a) reasonably available to the proponent, and (b) not
reasonably available to the opponent. As gross generalizations, such
a test will place greater demands on the prosecution than on the
accused in criminal cases, and it will place greater demands on
powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil plaintiffs. The
question of the resources that a party can bring to bear on improving
expertise is thus of crucial importance, rather than the question of
the burden of proof against which that party is operating, although
the two are not of course totally unrelated. I consider imprecise,
therefore, maxims that would vary the level of judicial scrutiny
196
according to the burden of proof borne by the proponent.
The
latter principle also tempts us, once again, to conflate admissibility
with sufficiency.
The indicated assessments of availability should not exalt form
over substance. A seemingly impecunious civil plaintiff may be
associated with a resourceful repeat player, such as a subrogating
insurance company or a well-heeled personal injury firm. These facts
should matter in the trial court’s assessment. Nevertheless, it would
not be implausible to create one categorical privilege against the
operation of this principle, a privilege protecting the accused in a
197
criminal case.
Even in the unusual case in which the accused is
195

I find problematic, therefore, those cases that exclude plaintiff’s toxicology
evidence just because substantial contrary epidemiological evidence is present. See
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 7-1.3.1[1], at 290. Once again, this is a sufficiency
question, pure and simple, and should be handled as such. See id. § 8-1.6.6. To be
sure, exclusion on grounds other than the reliability requirement of Rule 702,
including the ground that the toxicology evidence is simply a waste of time, might be
warranted, provided of course such an exclusionary rationale is not a sufficiency
determination in disguise. See id. § 8-1.6.5. When the issue is whether to exclude an
expert’s opinion in order to express a preference for more reliable background
information in the foundation of the opinion, then the exclusion also implicates the
previous discussion of exercising control over the testimonial form and content, at
least insofar as the expert might be required to opine based on the augmented
information base. In many cases, this can be done adequately on cross-examination,
and there is then no need to exclude the opinion originally proffered.
196
“All things being equal, the higher the standard of proof applicable to the
issue upon which the expertise is offered, the higher the required threshold
dependability should be.” Risinger, supra note 183, § 2-4.0, at 89.
197
This would mute concerns over the unfairness of strict application of Daubert to
evidence offered by the accused. See Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in
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wealthy, it may be unwise to allow courts to apply a nominally
symmetrical admissibility principle to exclude relevant expertise
offered by the accused, in view of the apparent tendency of the courts
to apply such principles more strictly to the accused than to the
198
prosecution. Such a privilege would also obviate concerns over the
199
constitutionality of excluding expertise offered by the accused.
Somewhat more debatably, but of more practical importance, the
accused might be privileged not to have to show, as a condition of
excluding the prosecution’s expertise on this theory, that the more
reliable expertise cannot reasonably be presented by the accused.
Three further refinements are worth attention here. First,
constraints on the development of more reliable expertise may be
non-monetary.
Ethical and legal restrictions on human
experimentation are obvious constraints that do more than raise the
200
monetary costs of developing new information.
The point may
have surprisingly broad implications. Even established medical
practices may have evolved over time or been articulated in
consensus-based “practice guidelines” without being subjected to
201
rigorous empirical testing. In recent years this has helped to spawn
202
a movement for “evidence-based medicine,” in some respects the
203
In contemplating an
medical profession’s version of Daubert.
exclusionary response under the principle of demanding better
evidence, courts may encounter ethical or legal restrictions on
Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 105 (2003) (arguing that the “positivist push”
of Daubert, if taken seriously, will unfairly disadvantage the accused, in part because
of resource disparities).
198
See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (reporting results of an
empirical analysis of decisions).
199
Cf. United States v. Scheffler, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (rejecting, over one dissent,
a constitutional argument under the Compulsory Process Clause that accused should
be privileged to introduce favorable polygraph evidence in the face of an explicit
exclusionary rule in the Military Rules of Evidence).
200
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 7-2.3.2, at 313 (noting ethical limitations on
the use of randomized controlled trials in epidemiology).
201
See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, Getting Evidence Into Practice, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 6 (1998)
(“[M]any of the questions that arise in daily clinical practice remain unaddressed by
well designed research.”); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The
Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 327, 328-29
(2001) (noting that even some clinical practice guidelines have not been developed
using evidence-based medicine).
202
See generally D.L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE
AND TEACH EBM (2d ed. 2000).
203
See Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 267, 287 (2001) (“Science-based medical evidence and the Daubert
trilogy reflect unorchestrated parallel movements in medicine and law about how to
assess expertise critically.”).
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human experimentation, including the requirement of informed
consent, that limit the ability of researchers to test the efficacy of now
conventional practices or the causal assumptions on which they were
204
originally based.
Considerations such as these will sometimes
warrant the admission of expertise that otherwise might fail the
reliability test, especially in regard to establishing the standard of care
205
in professional malpractice. In any event, the “cost” consideration
involved in making such determinations is, always in theory and often
in practice, a richly textured normative consideration.
The second refinement to be noted is that greater reliability
might be unavailable to a party within the context of a particular case
(even considering the matter retroactively from the beginning of the
litigation), yet reasonably available to that party within the context of
repeated litigation of the same or similar issue. At the outer reaches
of the better evidence idea, repeat players, such as the state in regard
to forensic science techniques, may plausibly be considered in regard
to the long run of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably
206
available in the short run to address a particular case.
In such
contexts, it would be important that the prosecution, or other repeat
player, be given reasonable notice of the courts’ intention to reject
expertise. Such notice need not come in the form of the rejection of
expertise offered in a particular case, however, for a court might
admit expertise while at the same time serving warning that in the
future such expertise will be rejected for want of sufficient reliability.
The third refinement once again takes account of the adversarial
nature of the proceedings. Suppose that the prosecution offers
204

In addition to problems of informed consent, there is significant controversy
over the proper restrictions on the use of placebo-controlled experiments, which
would be necessary to test the efficacy of conventional practices. See, e.g., Sharona
Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?,
33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 451 (2001) (noting that the principle of beneficence militates
against the inclusion of placebos in clinical trials under most if not all circumstances
in which a standard therapy exists, and arguing for a compromise position
significantly limiting the use of placebo-controlled studies). But see ROBERT J. LEVINE,
THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 4-5 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that
even established practices may be, and in appropriate cases should be, considered
“unvalidated” for purposes of applying ethical and legal principles controlling
experimentation, thus muting the principle of beneficence).
205
This, of course, assumes that courts will come around to applying the reliability
requirement of Daubert/Kumho to conventional medical testimony. See Shuman,
supra note 203, at 277-82 (observing that Daubert has been largely ignored in civil
cases outside the contexts of toxic torts and products liability). It is difficult to see
how jurisdictions controlled by the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 can avoid this
extension much longer.
206
See REDMAYNE, supra note 5, at 126 (emphasizing the peculiar force of the best
evidence principle when applied to the state in a criminal case).
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questioned document examiner testimony to identify the accused as
the writer of a ransom note, and assume that the court holds this
testimony inadmissible because (1) error rates have not been
established for this expert or even for the average comparably-trained
expert, (2) tests to determine such error rates could be easily
developed by or at the insistence of the state, and (3) such tests could
not be practically undertaken by the accused in this case. The state
proceeds without this expertise, because it cannot conduct the tests
(or cause other agencies to do so) within the time frame of the
present trial. Suppose, then, that the accused offers exactly the same
kind of handwriting identification testimony, except of course that it
is exonerative. Applying the principles as announced above, the trial
judge concludes that the latter testimony should not be excluded
because the better expertise (that which is accompanied by error rate
information) cannot be reasonably obtained by the accused or
because the accused is privileged not to have to make a showing of
unavailability. This would present a problem. The accused would be
allowed to present evidence of the same degree of reliability as that
which the prosecution is precluded from introducing. That might
seem unfair to the state, even if adequate notice of the court’s
concern was given to the state in previous decisions.
Is this a serious problem? At one level, the answer might be,
“No.” If the goal of the admissibility structure were solely to induce
improvements in the quality of expertise, then one can hardly
imagine a better system. Faced with the prospect that the accused
will be able to provide exonerative testimony while the prosecution
will be unable to present inculpatory testimony from the same
discipline, the state will have a very powerful incentive—stronger
than if neither side or both sides could use such evidence—to
investigate further the reliability of that form of expertise in order to
assure either that the prosecution could introduce such evidence or
207
that the defense could not.
However, the goal is not to improve
future reliability at any cost; accuracy in the present case ought not
be completely subordinated to accuracy in future cases. A balance
must be struck, and I suggest a compromise that would allow the
prosecution, in the hypothetical described above, to offer rebuttal
evidence using expert testimony of the same type, in this case
handwriting identification testimony that is not significantly less

207

The latter would be possible if, for example, the research showed facts
rendering the defense testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 or conditionally
admissible if the defense expert provides a more conservative opinion, as explained
above.
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reliable than that which the accused has introduced. The accused
would, however, retain the option to foreclose this line of inquiry by
209
not offering such testimony. The same rebuttal structure would be
employed in civil cases when a similar asymmetry of evidentiary
options occurs. Such a balance would retain significant pressure for
the long-run improvement of the reliability of under-validated
expertise without creating unfairness and potentially distorted
210
interim verdicts.
The foregoing considerations obviously do not exhaust the kinds
of issues that would need to be addressed. I have tried only to
present a framework that can be developed, refined, or modified as
further thought on the matter proceeds. Many of the details cannot
be perfectly anticipated and would need to be addressed in the
211
traditional common-law manner as particular issues arise.
But the

208

The problem is similar to, but not the same as, the problem discussed above in
connection with the previously considered principle for marshaling cognitive
resources. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text. The similarity lies in the
risk of negative inferences by the jury from a party’s (here, the prosecution’s) failure
to introduce evidence the jury would expect to receive. The main differences lie in
the greater need for a remedy—because here the prosecution has no other expertise
on the issue—and in the fact that a remedy is available in the present context that
does not so dramatically undermine the purpose of the exclusion.
209
The structure would parallel that used for character evidence, in which the
accused has the option of opening the door to character evidence with the
understanding that the prosecution can reply in kind. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1),
(2).
210
The degree of pressure can be adjusted, moreover, by choices about the timing
of the contemplated “rebuttal.” For example, we can choose whether to allow the
prosecution to offer the undervalidated handwriting expertise only at the formal
rebuttal stage, which would mean the prosecution would have to survive a motion to
dismiss at the end of its case-in-chief without the benefit of that testimony, or else to
require the defense to indicate its intention to use its handwriting expertise and then
allow the prosecution to anticipate that use by introducing its undervalidated experts
in its case-in-chief. I am inclined to believe the former solution gives a better
balance, but others may disagree.
211
Professor Imwinkelried sees in the resolution of these issues a multiplication of
preliminary issues affecting admissibility, and he fears that this will operate to the
disadvantage of financially weaker parties. See Imwinkelried, supra note 98, at 283-85.
The issues are complex, to be sure, but this is not substantially more so under my
proposed interpretations than under current practice. Reliability determinations,
using the Daubert factors and similar factors articulated after Daubert, already are
complicated matters. How could they be otherwise? My framework adds certain
factors to be considered, to be sure, but if my argument—that some such proposal
must be developed to make reliability standards coherent—is correct, then any
marginal increase in complexity is in the nature of the beast; conceptually
incoherent reliability determinations certainly cannot be justified on the ground that
they are simpler to state. If the costs of complexity are not worth the gains from a
coherent reliability inquiry, then the answer lies in rejecting the reliability
requirement itself.
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underlying theme should be clear enough: courts should not exclude
expert testimony (under Rule 702) just because it is “unreliable”
simpliciter, but only because (and when) by doing so, the reliability of
the expert testimony, in this or future cases, can be noticeably
212
improved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The general thrust of Daubert, that the judiciary should take a
more active role in monitoring the use of expertise in court, may be
entirely sound. If so, however, it might have been better had the law
of expert testimony not taken the path it has. Perhaps the demand
for reliability, as a condition of admissibility, is a conceptually poor
substitute for judges taking more seriously their responsibility to
grant directed verdicts and summary judgments when expert
testimony, taken in conjunction with non-expert evidence relating to
the same essential element of a cause of action or defense, is too weak
213
to support a rational verdict favorable to its proponent. Personally,
I am inclined to think so, at least so long as the burden of production
214
is rightly understood.

212

This, it will be noticed, is a necessary condition for exclusion, not a sufficient
condition. It might be the case, for example, that excluding expertise offered by a
party without significant economic or political power, such as a criminal defendant
or impecunious civil plaintiff, would cause the community of experts, as repeat
players themselves, to test their methods so as to improve their degree of reliability in
a cost justified manner. Professor Faigman seems to believe that this would be
enough to warrant exclusion, without regard to the resources of the proponent. See
Faigman, supra note 68, at 261-64. I am indebted to him for pressing me on this
point and thus requiring me to articulate the reason for my focus on party resources
rather than expert-community resources. The reason is this: To use the present
litigant solely as a means to the end of improving expertise offered in subsequent
trials involving other parties is unfair, a violation of a categorical imperative never to
use others solely as means to an end. For the litigant who must take what he or she
finds in terms of the reliability of available expertise, Rule 702 should allow the
litigant to use the best of what is available. If such use of available expertise is
considered problematic nonetheless, it would seem more properly to be the subject
of direct regulation of the expert community, which would invoke a different
justificatory framework with its own set of issues. On the other hand, to the extent
that a litigant bears some responsibility for the current level of reliability of the
challenged expertise—a responsibility arising out of access to or creation of data,
investigative economies of scale, or political power—it is fair to deprive the litigant of
expertise that does not attain the degree of reliability that those resources make
possible and desirable, given the nature of the case.
213
Professor Friedman argues forcefully along these lines. See Friedman, supra
note 89.
214
See Nance, supra note 121 (arguing that the burden of production should be
understood to embrace an obligation to assure that evidence is reasonably
complete).
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Be that as it may, Daubert, Kumho Tire, and amended Rule 702
have marked out a different, rockier conceptual path, and at least for
the time being, we must try to make the most of it. The use of a
dichotomous concept of reliability, whether or not founded on
deference to a non-legal discipline, simply poses too many problems.
These problems, in turn, encourage an epistemically invasive use of
admissibility to monitor the weight of the evidence. It is time to turn
away from that kind of thinking and try another tack, one that draws
on more manageable comparative reliability assessments that build
on a gradational concept of reliability.
In this paper I have argued that if we set aside the generally
unfounded concerns about juror credulity, we can still fashion
criteria of admissibility under Rule 702 that reflect the gatekeeping
mandate of the post-Daubert regime while employing such a
comparative assessment methodology. These criteria could assist the
trier of fact by (1) marshaling its cognitive resources around the
relatively reliable forms of expertise each party offers, and/or (2)
providing appropriate incentives for parties to discover, develop, or
present more reliable expertise than would otherwise be presented in
court. While the case for the former is still relatively weak and
undeveloped, the case for the latter is stronger. Careful use of the
latter, if not also the former, could effect a change for the better,
both in terms of the substance of the admissibility rulings and in
terms of the consistency and coherence of those rulings.

